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Abstract
Static Analysis of Regular Expressions
N. H. Weideman
Department of Computer Science,
University of Stellenbosch,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Thesis: MSc (Computer Science)
December 2017
Regular expressions are widely used throughout the programming community.
In most cases, regular expressions allow for pattern matching tasks to be per-
formed efficiently, but in some instances regular expression matching can be
extremely slow. The exploit of the potential slowness of regular expression
matching, is known as a regular expression denial of service attack. We in-
vestigate regular expression denial of service attacks, by approaching it from
a computational complexity and automata theoretic point of view. A method
for accurately modeling the matching time behaviour of a backtracking reg-
ular expression matcher, by using automata theoretic methods, is presented.
We analyze our models by using the concept of ambiguity in nondeterministic
finite-state automata. Our approach is evaluated on repositories of regular
expressions often used in practice. Techniques for mitigating the vulnerability
of backtracking regular expression matchers are investigated as a means to
thwart regular expression denial of service attacks.
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Uittreksel
Static Analysis of Regular Expressions
N. H. Weideman
Department of Computer Science,
University of Stellenbosch,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Tesis: MSc (Computer Science)
Desember 2017
Reguliere uitdrukkings word gereeld gebruik in die skryf van sagteware. In die
meeste gevalle stel sulke uitdrukkings mens in staat om patroonherkennings-
probleme op ’n doeltreffende manier op te los. Daar is egter sommige situasies
waar hierdie proses uiters tydrowend kan wees. Die uitbuiting van sulke kwes-
baarhede staan as ’n diensontseggingaanval bekend. Ons ondersoek hierdie
aanvalle vanuit die oogpunt van berekeningskompleksiteit en outomateteorie.
’n Metode word gegee om die herkenningstyd van ’n terugspoor herkenner van
reguliere uitdrukkings akkuraat te modelleer. Ons analiseer die modelle deur
gebruik te maak van die konsep van dubbelsinnigheid in nie-deterministiese
eindigetoestand-outomate. Die metodes word getoets deur dit toe te pas op
magasyne van reguliere uitdrukkings wat in die praktyk gebruik word. Teg-
nieke om die kwesbaarheid van terugspoor herkenners van reguliere uitdruk-
kings te verbeter word ondersoek, met die doelwit om diensontseggingaanvalle
te voorkom.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Regular expressions, which we refer to as regexes when discussing extended
regular expressions as found in software libraries, provide a convenient way
to describe the class of regular languages and are thus frequently studied in
the field of formal language theory [1; 2; 3]. In addition, regexes provide a
method for specifying patterns of interest in text in a compact way. This leads
to regexes being used widely in programming.
It is assumed throughout most of the programming community that regex
matching is fast. Even though this assumption is accurate in most cases, under
some conditions regex matching can be extremely slow. These conditions can
cause a regex to be vulnerable to a class of algorithmic complexity attacks,
known as regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) attacks. In ReDoS, a
program halts normal execution, due to it being stuck trying to determine if
a particular string contains some pattern of interest, by using regex matching.
A regex that is vulnerable to ReDoS is said to be vulnerable or evil.
There have been numerous accounts of ReDoS documented, some of which
are listed in [4]. One account in particular is the outage of the popular question-
and-answer website, Stack Overflow— a regex used to remove excessive whites-
pace from posts, turned out to be evil. This resulted in the website becoming
unresponsive after a post with a large number of whitespace characters was
submitted [5].
ReDoS, as far as we know, only happens when using a type of matcher
known as a backtracking matcher. This thesis will focus almost exclusively
on backtracking matchers. ReDoS is caused by the search algorithm used to
determine if and how an input string is matched by a regex. For evil regexes,
it is usually the case that a particular subexpression of the regex can match
some prefix of the input string in multiple ways, but that the entire input string
cannot be matched by the regex. The search algorithm then has to try and
match the input string with the subexpression, rejecting and backtracking each
time until all the multiple ways of matching the prefix with the subexpression
has been attempted. The backtracking performed by a matcher for an evil
regex is known as catastrophic backtracking [6].
1
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
Even though some regex matchers do not perform matching using back-
tracking, such as those used in the AWK programming language [7] and the
regex engine of MySQL [8], these alternative matchers do not support various
features found in typical backtracking matchers. One of these features (known
as capturing) makes it possible to determine which substring was matched by
a given subexpression of the regex. Note that the regex engine RE2 [9] is not
susceptible to ReDoS and supports capturing, but again has other limitations
in terms of supported features. Therefore, in spite of being susceptible to Re-
DoS, backtracking matchers are used in most popular programming languages
such as Java and Python.
The goal of this thesis is to develop static analysis techniques that can be
used to determine if a given regex is susceptible to ReDoS in the Java pro-
gramming language. Java was chosen specifically, because it implements a
backtracking matcher in its standard regex matching library. The backtrack-
ing matcher behaves similarly to many other regex libraries utilising the same
type of matcher, such as the one used by the commandline tool Perl Compati-
ble Regular Expressions [10]. However, unlike many other regex libraries that
also use backtracking matchers, the one found in Java does not seem to im-
plement arbitrary checks in the attempt to prevent catastrophic backtracking.
Therefore, the matching time of a regex used with the Java matcher, should
provide an upper bound for other matchers as well.
1.1 Thesis Outline
Our investigation into vulnerable regexes begins with a study of the fundamen-
tals of both formal language theory and regexes in Chapters 2 and 3. Using
this as a basis, Chapter 4 explains how regex matching works. In Chapter 5,
the context of ReDoS in the field of information security is given, as well as
other research done in this area. We begin the formulation of our approach
by explaining the concept of ambiguity and how it is related to regexes in
Chapter 6. Using the concept of ambiguity, we can decide when a regex is
vulnerable, which is explained in Chapter 7, and described in more detail in
Chapter 8. When a regex is classified as being vulnerable, it is required that
the matcher shows nonlinear polynomial, or exponential matching time for
some sequence of input strings of increasing length. Chapter 9 explains how
such strings can be constructed. Finally, experimental results of running our
analysis on repositories of commonly used regexes is given (Chapter 10), fol-
lowed by an investigation into how vulnerable regexes can (in certain cases)
be ameliorated (Chapter 11).
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 2
Fundamentals of Formal Language
Theory
2.1 Introduction
To understand regular expressions and what makes them vulnerable, we first
need to define them formally. Since regular expressions are studied in formal
language theory, it seems logical that we start by defining some relevant con-
cepts therein. These concepts are discussed in more detail in the textbook
Introduction to the Theory of Computation by Michael Sipser [11].
2.2 Alphabets, Strings and Languages
An alphabet is a nonempty finite set of symbols, while a string is a finite
(perhaps empty) sequence of symbols from an alphabet. The length of a string
w is the number of symbols in w, and is denoted by |w|. By |w|a, we denote
the number of symbols in the sequence w equal to the symbol a. Also, by wk
we denote k successive copies of the string w. If all symbols of some string w
are from some alphabet Σ, we say that w is a string over Σ. When |w| = 0,
we say that w is the empty string and denote it by ε. We assume that ε 6∈ Σ
and denote Σ ∪ {ε} by Σε. Finally, a language is a subset (possibly empty) of
the set of all strings over some alphabet.
2.3 Finite-state Automata
A deterministic finite-state automaton (DFA) is a state machine that reads
input strings and either accepts or rejects such strings after the final symbol
has been read. A DFAM , over an alphabet Σ, defines a language consisting of
all input strings accepted by M . The set of input strings accepted by a DFA
3
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is said to be the language recognised by the DFA, and is denoted as L(M).
We formally define DFAs in Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.1. A DFA is a 5-tuple A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ), such that:
1. Q is a finite nonempty set of states,
2. Σ is the finite input alphabet,
3. δ is the deterministic transition function where δ : Q× Σ→ Q,
4. q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and
5. F ⊆ Q is the set of accept states.
Let |A|Q = |Q| be the number of states and |A|δ = |Σ||Q| the number of
transitions in A.
Nondeterministic finite-state automata (NFA) are a generalisation of DFAs.
As with DFAs, an NFA M , over an alphabet Σ, defines a language consisting
of all the input strings accepted by M and the set of input strings accepted
by an NFA is said to be the language recognised by the NFA, and is denoted
as L(M).
While processing input strings symbol by symbol, the next state that an
NFA will transition to is selected nondeterministically from a set of states
determined by the current state and the next input symbol, or only by the
current state if the NFA nondeterministically selects not to read an input
symbol. Note that when no input symbol is consumed, we sometimes say that
an ε is consumed, in the sense that the empty string is consumed. These tran-
sitions are referred to as empty transitions (or ε-transitions) and are labeled
with the symbol ε.
Intuitively, nondeterminism can be thought of as if the NFA concurrently
traverses all valid path options, while reading some input string. After the
entire input string has been consumed, the machine accepts the input string if
the input string caused at least one of these paths to end in a so-called accept
state. It rejects the input string otherwise.
Let us now formally define an NFA.
Definition 2.2. An NFA is a 5-tuple A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ), such that:
1. Q is a finite nonempty set of states,
2. Σ is the finite input alphabet,
3. δ is the transition function where δ : Q×Σε×Q→ N (where N denotes
the positive integers),
4. q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and
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5. F ⊆ Q is the set of accept states.
Let |A|Q = |Q| be the number of states and |A|δ =
∑
q1,q2∈Q,α∈Σε δ(q1, α, q2)
the number of transitions in A.
A run of an NFA on a given input string is a sequence of states, input sym-
bols and transition labels from N, traversed by the matcher while attempting
to find a match. The formal definition of a run is given next. As a notational
convenience let piΣ(w) (w is a string over Σ′ where Σ ⊆ Σ′) represent the word
b1 . . . bn ∈ Σ∗, where bi = ai if ai ∈ Σ, and bi = ε otherwise. Informally, piΣ(w)
denotes the word obtained from w by removing all symbols not in Σ.
Definition 2.3 ([12]). For an NFA A = (Q,Σ, q0, δ, F ) and w ∈ Σ∗, a run of A
on w is a string r = s0α1(j1)s1 . . . sn−1αn(jn)sn, where s0 = q0, si ∈ Q, αi ∈ Σε
and ji ∈ N such that δ(si, αi+1, si+1) ≥ ji+1 for 0 ≤ i < n, and piΣ(r) = w. A
run is accepting if sn ∈ F .
Figure 2.1 shows a state diagram of an NFA over the alphabet {a} that
recognises the language {ε} ∪ {an | n ∈ N and n is divisble by 2 or 3}.
Note that we define the transition function δ in such a way to allow for
parallel transitions, that is multiple transitions between the same two states
on the same transition symbol, or even multiple ε-transitions. Explicitly,
δ(q1, α, q2) = n, where n > 0, implies there are n transitions from state q1
to q2 on input α (and no transitions if n = 0). We number these multiple
transitions from 1 to n. When describing a path in an NFA we distinguish be-
tween parallel transitions using the notation α(i), where α is the input symbol
of the corresponding transition and i denotes the ith transition on α between
the two states under consideration. For example, p
α(2)−−→ q indicates the second
transition on symbol α from state p to q. We will also use from time to time
subscripts to number parallel transitions, for example, p εi−→ q denotes the ith
ε-transition from p to q.
We extended the definition of an NFA to allow for parallel transitions, since
we are not only interested in the language accepted by an NFA, but also in
the number of paths that can be used to accept a given word.
When drawing an NFA, parallel transitions will be indicated by either
drawing the multiple transitions explicitly, or by adding multiple copies of a
given label to a transition. Figure 2.2 illustrates these two methods.
Sometimes, we will work with automata for which parallel transitions are
not possible. In these cases and all cases in which parallel transitions are either
impossible or irrelevant, we will use the standard notation for transitions:
δ : Q× Σε → P(Q).
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q0
q1 q2
q3 q4 q5
ε
a
a
ε
a a
a
Figure 2.1: A state diagram representing an NFA that recognises the language over
the alphabet {a} of strings with length a multiple of two or three.
(a)
q0 q1
ε
ε
(b)
q0 q1
ε, ε
Figure 2.2: An illustration of the different ways of drawing parallel transitions,
by either (a) drawing each transition explicitly, or (b) adding multiple labels on the
same transition.
2.4 Regular Operations
If a language is recognised by an NFA, it is said to be a regular language.
Various operations, known as regular operations, preserve regularity. Next we
define three such operations.
Definition 2.4. Assume A and B are languages. Then union, concatenation
and Kleene star are defined as follows.
1. Union: A ∪B = {x | x ∈ A or x ∈ B}.
2. Concatenation: A ·B = {xy | x ∈ A and y ∈ B}.
3. Kleene star: A∗ = {ε} ∪ {x1x2 . . . xk | k ≥ 1 and each xi ∈ A}.
The basic idea behind the union operation is simply to combine all the
strings in the operand languages into a new language. With concatenation
a new language is formed by concatenating strings in the first language with
strings in the second. Lastly, the Kleene star operation on A defines the
language (∪∞i=1Ai) ∪ {ε}, where Ai denotes A concatenated with itself i times.
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2.5 Regular Expressions
The expressions built inductively from ∅, ε, a ∈ Σ and (some of) the regular
operations, are called regular expressions. The language defined by a regular
expression E, denoted by L(E), is the (possibly empty) set of strings obtained
by recursively defining L(F ) for each subexpression F of E.
Definition 2.5. A regular expression R is either:
1. a, for some a in the alphabet Σ, where L(a) = {a},
2. ε (the empty string), where L(ε) = {ε},
3. ∅, where L(∅) = ∅,
4. R = (R1 | R2), where R1 and R2 are regular expressions, where L(R) =
L(R1) ∪ L(R2),
5. R = (R1 · R2), where R1 and R2 are regular expressions, where L(R) =
L(R1) · L(R2), or
6. R = (R1∗), where R1 is a regular expression, where L(R) = L(R1)∗.
When evaluating regular expressions (i.e., determining the language defined
by regular expressions), ∗ (Kleene star) takes precedence over · (Concatena-
tion) and concatenation takes precedence over | (Union). We can override the
normal precedence of the regular operations by using parentheses. Regular
expressions can further be compressed by writing E1E2 instead of E1 ·E2. We
shall use the convention of using Ek1 to denote the expression E1 concatenated
with itself k times. Let |E| be the number of subexpressions in regex E, or
equivalently, the number of symbols in E, excluding parentheses. We number
the subexpressions in E in a depth-first preorder, denoting by E(i) subex-
pression i (e.g. for E = ((a · b) | b)∗ we have E(1) = E, E(3) = a · b and
E(4) = a).
2.6 Regular Expression to NFA Construction
Regular languages are closed under regular operations, so by definition the lan-
guage denoted by a regular expression must be a regular language. We stated
in Section 2.4 that regular languages are those recognised by NFAs. Conse-
quently, the language denoted by a regular expression can be recognised by
some NFA. To obtain an NFA recognising the language denoted by a regular
expression is fairly straightforward. Using Definitions 2.6 to 2.11 we can con-
struct an NFA recognising the language denoted by a given regular expression.
This can be achieved by starting at a base case (Definitions 2.6 to 2.8) and
building up the rest of the expression by repeatedly applying Definitions 2.9
to 2.11 as needed.
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Definition 2.6. (NFA recognising a single alphabet symbol a′)
Let A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) be an NFA where:
1. Q = {q0, q1},
2. Σ is an alphabet containing a′,
3. δ(q0, a′, q1) = 1 (and δ is 0 otherwise), and
4. F = {q1}.
Definition 2.7. (NFA recognising ε)
Let A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) be an NFA where:
1. Q = {q0, q1},
2. δ(q0, ε, q1) = 1 (and δ is 0 otherwise), and
3. F = {q1}.
Definition 2.8. (NFA recognising ∅)
Let A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) be an NFA where:
1. Q = {q0},
2. δ is always 0, and
3. F = ∅ (there are no accept states).
Definition 2.9. (Union)
Let A1 = (Q1,Σ, δ1, q1, F1) and A2 = (Q2,Σ, δ2, q2, F2) be NFAs over the same
alphabet Σ. We define A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) as:
1. Q = {q0} ∪Q1 ∪Q2 (where we assume the sets in the union are disjoint
and q0 6∈ (Q1 ∪Q2)),
2. if q, q′ ∈ Q and a ∈ Σε, then
δ(q, a, q′) =

δ1(q, a, q
′) if q, q′ ∈ Q1
δ2(q, a, q
′) if q, q′ ∈ Q2
1 if q = q0, a = ε and q′ = q1
1 if q = q0, a = ε and q′ = q2
3. q0 is the initial state, and
4. F = F1 ∪ F2.
We have that L(A) = L(A1) ∪ L(A2).
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Definition 2.10. (Concatenation)
Let A1 = (Q1,Σ, δ1, q1, F1) and A2 = (Q2,Σ, δ2, q2, F2) be NFAs over the al-
phabet Σ. We define A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) as:
1. Q = Q1 ∪Q2 (where we assume the sets in the union are disjoint),
2. if q, q′ ∈ Q and a ∈ Σε, then
δ(q, a, q′) =

δ1(q, a, q
′) if q, q′ ∈ Q1
δ2(q, a, q
′) if q, q′ ∈ Q2
1 if q ∈ F1, a = ε and q′ = q2
3. q0 = q1, and
4. F = F2.
We have that L(A) = L(A1) · L(A2).
Definition 2.11. (Kleene star)
Let A1 = (Q1,Σ, δ1, q1, F1) be an NFA. We define A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) as:
1. Q = {q0} ∪Q1 (where we assume that q0 6∈ Q1),
2. if q, q′ ∈ Q and a ∈ Σε, then
δ(q, a, q′) =

δ1(q, a, q
′) if q, q′ ∈ Q1
1 if q ∈ F1, a = ε and q′ = q1
1 if q = q0, a = ε and q′ = q1
3. F = {q0} ∪ F1.
We have that L(A) = L(A1)∗.
2.7 Ambiguity of NFA
An NFA is said to be ambiguous if some string can be accepted by traversing
two or more distinct paths of states and transitions. The degree of ambiguity
of a string w (in an NFA M) is the number of accepting paths for w in M .
Similarly, the degree of ambiguity of an NFA M is defined as the maximum
number of ways in which any string in the language can be accepted. Let us
use the NFA shown in Figure 2.1 to explain the concept of ambiguity. The
strings described by an for which n is a multiple of either 2 or 3, but not both,
are not ambiguous. When n is a multiple of 2, but not 3, the string can only
be accepted by traversing the q1, q2 loop. Conversely, when n is a multiple of
3, but not 2, the string can only be accepted by traversing the q3, q4, q5 loop.
The strings am where m is a multiple of both 2 and 3 are indeed ambiguous.
Since each of these strings can only be accepted by either the q1, q2 or q3, q4, q5
loop, these strings have a degree of ambiguity of 2. Furthermore, since there
are no other strings in L(M), the NFA M has a degree of ambiguity of 2.
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2.7.1 Infinite Degree of Ambiguity
For some NFAs there is no upper bound on the number of ways in which all
input strings can be accepted. In essence, for any string that can be accepted in
m ways, there is another string that can be accepted in more than m ways. In
these cases we say that these NFAs have infinite degree of ambiguity (IDA) [13].
For NFAs with IDA, we are exclusively interested in those NFAs for which
the degree of ambiguity grows in relation to the length of the input string. For
some NFAs, a single input string (of finite length) can be accepted in an infinite
number of ways. This usually occurs for NFAs with loops consisting only of ε-
transitions (called ε-loops). We disregard these NFAs when discussing degree
of ambiguity and therefore, when referring to the degree of ambiguity of an
NFA, it can be assumed the NFA does not have ε-loops.
To illustrate the growth of the degree of ambiguity in relation to the length
of the input string, supposeM is an NFA with IDA. If the degree of ambiguity
of M has an order of growth O(n), with n being the length of the input
string, we say M has IDA of degree 1. Intuitively, IDA of degree (at least) 1
occurs if M has two states p0 and q0, each with a self-loop on the same input
string w, as well as the property that q0 can be reached from p0 while reading
w [14]. Figure 2.3 shows an abstract NFA with IDA of degree at least 1. The
dashed transitions in the abstract NFA represent substructures that recognise
L(E), where E is the expression on the label of the dashed transition. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that the expressions on the labels of the dashed
transitions, and the substructures recognising them, are unambiguous. To see
why this abstract NFA has IDA of degree at least 1, suppose the expressions
E0,0, E0,1 and E0,2 recognise at least one common input string w, that is
w ∈ L(E0,0)∩L(E0,1)∩L(E0,2). The input string ww has degree of ambiguity
2, since it can be recognised via the paths p0
w−→ p0 w−→ q0 or p0 w−→ q0 w−→ q0.
Similarly, the input string www has a degree of ambiguity of 3, since the
accepting paths are p0
w−→ p0 w−→ p0 w−→ q0, p0 w−→ p0 w−→ q0 w−→ q0 and p0 w−→ q0 w−→
q0
w−→ q0. In general for wn, there is a linear number of ways to divide the n
substrings w between the two loops in the abstract NFA.
If the degree of ambiguity of M has an order of growth O(n2), we say M
has IDA of degree 2. Figure 2.4 shows an abstract NFA with IDA of degree
at least 2. Suppose w0 ∈ L(E0,0)∩L(E0,1)∩L(E0,2), w1 ∈ L(E1,0)∩L(E1,1)∩
L(E1,2) and v0 ∈ L(F0). In this case, for the input string wn0 v0wn1 , there is a
quadratic number of ways, in n, to divide the w0 and w1 substrings between the
four loops in the abstract NFA. Specifically, for each of the n ways of dividing
the w0 substrings between the p0 and q0 loops, there are n ways of dividing
the w1 substrings between the p1 and q1 loops. Therefore, the abstract NFA
has IDA of degree of at least 2.
This concept can be generalised to an NFA with IDA of degree n, as shown
in Figure 2.5.
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p0 q0
E0,0
E0,1
E0,2
Figure 2.3: An abstract NFA with IDA of degree at least 1.
p0 q0 p1 q1
E0,0
E0,1
E0,2
F0
E1,0
E1,1
E1,2
Figure 2.4: An abstract NFA with IDA of degree at least 2.
p0 q0 p1 q1 . . . pn−1 qn−1
E0,0
E0,1
E0,2
F0
E1,0
E1,1
E1,2
F1 Fn−2
En−1,0
En−1,1
En−1,2
Figure 2.5: An abstract NFA with IDA of degree at least n.
2.7.2 Exponential Degree of Ambiguity
In Section 2.7.1 we have seen that it is possible to make the degree of IDA arbi-
trarily large by adding more of the structures with states pi and qi, having the
self-loops on Ei,0 and Ei,2 respectively and joined with the transition through
Ei,1. If there existed an NFA with an infinite number of these structures, there
could be no polynomial with degree high enough to describe the rate of growth
of the degree of ambiguity in the length of the input string. We can simulate
such an NFA by adding a loop, so that at least one pair of pi and qi states can
be traversed an arbitrary number of times — this is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
In cases such as these the rate of growth of the degree of ambiguity is exponen-
tial in the length of the input string, i.e., the NFA has an exponential degree
of ambiguity (EDA) [13].
Intuitively, exponential degree of ambiguity occurs when there is some state
in the NFA such that this state can loop back to itself in more than one way,
reading the same input string in each case. This can be illustrated with an
abstract NFA such as the one shown in Figure 2.7. Suppose there exists some
input string w ∈ L(E0,0)∩L(E0,1). We refer to the self-loop for the expression
E0,0 as the top loop and for the expression E0,1 as the bottom loop. For an
input string such as wn, every w substring can be matched by either the top
loop or the bottom loop. Therefore, every w added to the input string will
cause the number of ways to divide the w substrings between the top– and
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p0 q0
E0,0
E0,1
E0,2
u0
Figure 2.6: An abstract NFA with EDA.
p0
E0,0
E0,1
Figure 2.7: A more intuitive illustration of an abstract NFA with EDA.
bottom loop to double. In other words, the degree of ambiguity will double for
every w appended to the input string. Consequently, the degree of ambiguity
is exponential in the length of the input string and the NFA is exponentially
ambiguous.
2.7.3 Formal Definition of Degree of Ambiguity
Next we formally define infinite and exponential degree of ambiguity.
Definition 2.12. The degree of ambiguity for w ∈ Σ∗, with respect to the
NFA A (without ε-loops), denoted by dA(w), is the number of accepting runs
on w in A. The degree of ambiguity of A is the maximum degree of ambiguity
over all w ∈ Σ∗, which might be infinite, in which case we say A has infinite
degree of ambiguity (IDA). When A has IDA, we consider the rate at which
the maximum number of accepting runs grows in proportion to the length of
the input strings. This rate might be exponential, described by saying A has
exponential degree of ambiguity (EDA), or polynomial, described as A being
polynomially ambiguous.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we defined relevant concepts in formal language theory — we
defined regular languages and their relation to NFAs. We explained what it
means for an NFA to have either finite or infinite ambiguity. Using these
concepts we will present a decision procedure for when regexes are vulnerable.
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Regex Fundamentals
3.1 Introduction
Even though regexes originate from a well-defined mathematical model, as
described in Chapter 2, in practice regexes have been extended to increase their
pattern matching capability further. In this chapter we investigate features and
syntax found in practical regex matching engines. Specifically, we focus on the
regex engine found in Java.
3.2 Regexes in Practice
As discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical study of regular expressions forms
part of the field known as formal language theory. A formal language comprises
a set of strings or words over symbols known as an alphabet. Dependent on
the class of formal languages under consideration, a specific formalism is used
to specify the strings in a given formal language of interest.
Similar to theoretical regular expressions, regexes in practice typically op-
erate over an alphabet consisting of all symbols in some character set, for
example the US-ASCII character set, and a specific regex describes the lan-
guage of words matched by the regular expression under consideration. We
say a regex matches an input string if it is contained within the language of
words described by the regex under consideration. Note that in some cases a
regex is said to match an input string if there is a substring of the input string
that is matched by the regular expression — this is referred to as submatching.
In other cases a regex only matches an input string if the entire input string
is matched by the regular expression, referred to as exact matching. We focus
mainly on exact matching, but it is possible to convert from one to the other,
as shown in Section 3.6.
On a high level, regexes are sequences of symbols used to describe patterns.
These patterns allow for a more general search through text than simply search-
ing for specific words verbatim. As a simple example, the regex colou?r can
13
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be used to search for occurrences of the words color and colour in a piece of
text, when the reader is unsure whether the author used American or British
spelling.
3.3 Regular Expression Extensions
As regular expressions became more popular as a pattern matching tool, ex-
tensions were added to regular expression matching engines to increase the
class of possible patterns that can be specified, and also the ease with which
these patterns can be specified. Regular expressions extended with these fea-
tures are typically referred to as regexes or extended regexes. We only use the
term regular expression when we are specifically referring to the mathematical
model defined in Section 2.5.
Regexes developed into multiple different standards, called flavours of
regexes. We focus specifically on the flavour used in the Java programming
language, implemented in the java.util.regex package.
Two of the most common extensions built into regexes are the question
mark operator and the plus operator. The expression E? may be considered
as an abbreviation for (E | ε), whereas E+ denotes EE∗. For example, the
regex Mon(day)? can be used to match either Monday or Mon if, for example, a
search is required for both the word Monday and its abbreviation in a piece of
text. The plus operator can for example be used to search for positive, integral
powers of ten in a list of numbers with the regex 10+, as it will match 10, 100,
1000 and so on.
Another extension is the interval quantifier, which ensures that a regex
matches with the operand subexpression any number of times within a specified
range. Reusing the previous example of searching for positive, integral powers
of ten in a list of numbers, the interval quantifier makes it possible to place
bounds on the powers of ten to search for, for example, 10{2, 4} will match
the strings 100, 1000 and 10000.
All of the above mentioned extensions can be represented in equivalent
ways with regular expressions. These particular extensions merely provide no-
tational convenience. Especially in the case of the interval quantifier, explicitly
specifying the different options represented might not be practical when the
interval is large. Indeed, rewriting a regex as a regular expression can increase
the size exponentially (in terms of the number of symbols used to represent the
regex and regular expression). Consider the regex a{10}, which is represented
with 5 symbols. The equivalent regular expressions is aaaaaaaaaa, which re-
quires 10 symbols to represent. In general, a regular expression equivalent to
E{n} will be exponentially longer.
Not all regexes can be converted to equivalent regular expressions. One
extension, called a backreference, instructs a matcher to match the same sub-
string as was matched by a previous subexpression. This cannot be achieved by
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a regular expression, since it allows the specification of nonregular languages.
To illustrate this, consider the regex (a∗)b\1, which matches any number of
a’s, followed by a b, and again followed by the same number of a’s as be-
fore. The language matched by this regex is not regular, since an NFA for this
language will be required to store the exact number of a’s that was matched
before the b, which is not possible.
3.4 Regex Basics
In this section we look at how regexes are constructed and used in practice.
Most characters in a regex instruct the matcher to match the specific specified
character in a given input string. Specifically, the regex abc instructs the
matcher to match the symbol a followed by b, followed by c. Note that this
regex consists of the subexpressions a, b and c, each indicating a match with
the corresponding symbol. By writing these regexes consecutively, we indicate
that in the input string these symbols should also appear in succession. This
corresponds to concatenation as defined in Chapter 2. Regex concatenation is
obviously not limited to single symbol subexpressions. That is, for the regexes
E1 and E2, their concatenation E1E2 matches any concatenation of strings
matched by E1 and E2.
Some characters, called metacharacters, have a different meaning than sim-
ply indicating a match with the corresponding symbol. The metacharacters
make it possible to describe general patterns either by performing operations
on subexpressions, or by performing grouping to create such subexpressions.
Some of the most frequently used metacharacters are broadly described in the
next few subsections. For an in-depth discussion consult [15].
3.4.1 Alternation
Alternation in regexes gives the matcher a choice between matching either with
the first or with the second operand subexpression. For example, (E1 |E2) will
match an input string with E1 or E2. In the case of certain regex matchers,
such as the one used in Java, the matcher first attempts to match an input
string with E1 and only attempts matching with E2 if a match with E1 is
impossible. In essence, using our previous example of the regex (E1 |E2),
matching with the subexpression E1 is assigned a higher priority than with
E2.
3.4.2 Quantifiers
Quantifiers in regexes allow for a subexpression to be used a varying number
of times while matching. The most common quantifier is the zero-or-more
quantifier denoted by a star. This is referred to as the Kleene star operator (or
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Kleene star quantifier) and performs a similar role as the Kleene star operator
found in regular expressions (as discussed in Chapter 2). The Kleene star
operator allows the matcher to use the operand subexpression zero or more
times in succession while matching. For example, for a regex E, the regex
E∗ matches ε (the empty string), all strings matched by E, by E2 (that is E
concatenated with itself), by E3, etc.
Other quantifiers include the zero-or-once quantifier, denoted with a ques-
tion mark as in E? (which matches either ε or uses E for matching), and the
once-or-more quantifier, denoted by a plus sign, as in E+ (matching with E, or
E2, or E3, etc.). We refer to the zero-or-once and the once-or-more quantifier
as the question mark and plus quantifier respectively.
The interval quantifier forces the operand subexpression to be used re-
peatedly, a number of times in a specified range, in succession. For example,
E{l, h} matches with Eh, or Eh−1, . . . , or El, with l ≤ h.
Any quantifier with finite bounds can be rewritten using only alternation.
For example, E1? is equivalent to (E1 | ε). Similarly, the regex E1{l, h} is
equivalent to (Eh1 | Eh−11 | . . . | El1).
As with alternation, certain matches are prioritised over others. In the
default case with E{l, h} for example, matching with Ei is assigned a higher
priority than with Ei−1, assuming l < i ≤ h. This holds true for the implicit
bounds of the Kleene star quantifier, question mark quantifier and the plus
quantifier as well. This prioritisation can also be reversed, which is discussed
in greater detail in Section 3.4.2.1.
3.4.2.1 Greedy and Lazy Quantifiers
Quantifiers can be either greedy or lazy. For a greedy quantifier, after matching
a nonempty substring using the operand of the quantifier, the matcher will
rather match with the operand again, than with subexpressions successive to
the quantifier. Note that this is done while remaining in the bounds of the
quantifier. For the greedy question mark quantifier E?, the matcher will rather
match with E, than with the implicit ε. Similarly, for the greedy interval
quantifier E{l, h}, the matcher will be forced to use E for matching at least
l times, after which it will rather match with E again, rather than using
subsequent subexpressions (assuming E has been used fewer than h times).
For a lazy quantifier, the matcher does the opposite, i.e., the matcher
rather matches with successive subexpressions instead of using the operand
of the lazy quantifier again. In Java, quantifiers are altered to be lazy by
appending a question mark symbol after the quantifier. That is E∗?, E??, E+?
and E{m,n}? denote the lazy Kleene star, question mark, plus and interval
quantifiers respectively.
Greedy and lazy quantifiers can be explained using the concept of priorities,
which was mentioned in Section 3.4.1. Similarly to alternation in which the left
side operand subexpression is matched with a higher priority than the right
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side operand, greedy quantifiers prioritise matching again with the operand
subexpression higher than matching with successive subexpressions, while lazy
quantifiers do the opposite.
It may be tempting to think that if a greedy quantifier is applied to a
subexpression, a new subexpression is obtained which matches longest possible
substrings (when the starting point of the submatch is specified), but this is
not always true. To see this, consider the regex (a | ab)∗b?. For the input
string ab, the matcher will elect to match a with the left operand of the first
alternation. After the failure to match b with the left operand of the (a | ab)
subexpression, the matcher continues and matches b with the b?. This is done
in preference to releasing the matched symbol a and rematching the entire
input string with the right side of the first alternation, i.e., ab. Consequently,
the subexpression with the greedy Kleene star quantifier matches the shorter
substring a with a higher priority than longer substring ab.
Note that changing a greedy quantifier to a lazy quantifier (or conversely),
does not modify the set of strings a given regex can match, but instead only
changes what substring is matched by which subexpression.
3.4.3 Character Classes
Character classes provide a compact way to express a set of single symbols
that can all be matched. For example, the character class [abc] can match
either of the symbols a, b or c. Note, since character classes only ever match a
single symbol, symbols written next to each other in a character class denotes
their union, rather than concatenation. Character classes also allow for the
expression of a range of characters in a concise way. For example, the character
classes [a-c] and [abc] are equivalent. A range of characters can be specified
between any two characters, as long as the byte representation of the first
character is smaller or equal to that of the second. For example, the character
range [x-y] specifies all characters with a byte representation between that
of x and y (inclusively).
Java contains multiple predefined character classes — some of these are
listed in Table 3.1. Note, we only give a few examples of the predefined char-
acter classes for specifying character properties (denoted by \p{...}). In total
there are more than 600 ways to specify character properties and many can be
found in [15]. Java also defines a wildcard symbol which acts as a character
class matching any single symbol. We use the symbol . to denote the wildcard
symbol.
3.4.3.1 Intersection of Character Classes
Intersection can be performed in character classes with the && operator. For ex-
ample, [abc&&cde] matches only c, as it is the only symbol in both [abc] and
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Table 3.1: Some of the predefined character classes found in Java.
Sequence Description Negated
\d Digits \D
\w Word characters \W
\s White space characters \S
\p{Lower} Any lowercase Latin Alphabet character \P{Lower}
\p{Digit} Any Arabic digit character \P{Digit}
\p{Punct} Any punctuation character \P{Punct}
[cde]. Note that the union in character classes, mentioned in Section 3.4.3,
takes precedence over intersection.
3.4.3.2 Negation of Character Classes
A character class can be negated so that it matches any single symbol not
in the original character class. This is done by adding a caret symbol ^ at
the start of the character class. For example, [^abc] will match any single
symbol, except for a, b or c.
3.4.3.3 Nested Character Classes
Character classes may contain other character classes (referred to as nested
character classes). This becomes especially useful when used in combination
with intersection and negation. For example, [[a-z]&&[^aeiou]] matches
any single symbol corresponding to a lowercase Latin alphabet letter, except
for vowels.
3.4.4 Grouping
It is possible to group subexpressions by placing parentheses around the appro-
priate subexpressions, and then applying for example alternation and quan-
tifiers to these grouped subexpressions. In some cases grouping has the side
effect of indicating to the regex engine to store the substring of the input string
that was matched by the subexpression contained within the group. Groups
that store the matched substring are referred to as capturing groups, and even
though it is possible to specify noncapturing groups, we will assume all groups
are capturing.
Capturing groups make it possible to perform certain shallow parsing tasks.
For example, (1[012] | [1-9]):([0-5][0-9])(am | pm) can be used to parse in-
put strings in 12-hour time format. The hour is stored by the first capturing
group (1[012] | [1-9]), the minutes by the second group ([0-5][0-9]), and
time period by the third (am | pm). The contents of a capturing group can be ac-
cessed after the match, or during the match as in the case of backreferences (see
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Section 3.5). In the Java programming language, after a match, the contents
of a specific capturing group is accessed using the method matcher.group(i),
with matcher an instance of the Matcher class used to perform the match and
i a positive integer corresponding to the ith capturing group. Note that cap-
turing groups are ordered by the position of their left (or opening) parentheses.
The capturing group with the leftmost opening parenthesis is capturing group
number 1.
Storing substrings matched by subgroups requires that the regex matcher
keeps track of what was matched by every capturing group of the regex, which
is straightforward for a backtracking matcher, but is nontrivial to implement
in other matchers. Thus capturing groups are typically only implemented in
backtracking matchers, with RE2 being the exception [9].
3.4.5 Atomic Groups and Possessive Quantifiers
Atomic groups indicate to the matcher that any substring matched with the
subexpression contained in the atomic group, should be regarded as a unit.
This means that as soon as the atomic group has matched a substring, any
stored information regarding other ways the atomic group subexpression could
have matched any prefix of the string remaining to be matched, is disregarded.
Also, possessive quantifiers are a notational convenience for quantifiers in
atomic groups. Marking a quantifier as possessive indicates that the quan-
tifier and its operand subexpression are grouped in an atomic subgroup. In
other words, the regex (E∗+), where E∗+ denotes the possessive Kleene star
quantifier applied to the regex E, can be expressed with an atomic group as
(?>E∗), where (?> . . .) denote an atomic group. It follows similarly for the
other possessive quantifiers.
In [15], a motivating example is provided for the use of atomic groups. The
regex in this example is required to truncate decimal numbers at the second
digit after the decimal point (i.e., the second digit should be kept), except
when the third digit is nonzero, in which case the truncated number should in-
clude three digits after the decimal point. A regex serving this purpose would
need to match decimal numbers with three or more digits to the right of the
decimal point. Using capturing groups (see Section 3.4.4), one could replace
the matched decimal number with another decimal number that has only two
or three digits to the right of the decimal point. This replacement is done in
a way depending on if the third digit after the decimal point in the matched
number is zero or not. A regex similar to (\d+\.\d\d[1-9]?)\d∗ is suggested
for this purpose. The capturing group (\d+\.\d\d[1-9]?) matches any dec-
imal number with two digits after the decimal point, as well as those with a
third nonzero digit. Digits that are three (if the third is zero, or four if the
third is nonzero) or more positions after the decimal point is matched by \d∗,
which is not captured, and can thus be removed. Even though this is suffi-
cient for our purpose, we consider next what happens when the regex matches
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0.125. The capturing group matches the entire decimal number, so effectively
0.125 will be replaced with itself. One might be tempted to improve the effi-
ciency of the incorporating find-and-replace code by modifying the regex to be
(\d+\.\d\d[1-9]?)\d+. This modification restricts matches to decimal num-
bers with digits that will be removed when substituting the original number
with the contents of the capturing group. But with input 0.125, the subex-
pression [1-9]? is optional and the subexpression \d+ not, and thus the last
digit 5 of 0.125 will be matched by \d+. Consequently, it will not be included
in the capturing group and so it will be removed in the substitution, rounding
0.125 to 0.12. This can be fixed by including the [1-9]? subexpression in an
atomic group, i.e., using (\d+\.\d\d(?>[1-9]?))\d+. In doing so, if [1-9]?
is capable of matching part of the decimal number, it can never be released to
match the final \d+ instead.
Further motivation for atomic groups and possessive quantifiers is pro-
vided by the fact that it may allow a match to fail faster. Suppose for example
the regex [0-9]+\.[0-9]+ is used to search for numbers with at least some
digits after the decimal point, from a given list of numbers. Since the first
subexpression [0-9]+ can match any number of digits (as long as it matches
at least one), for every nonnegative integer encountered in the list of num-
bers, say 1000, it will first match all digits in 1000 (as the plus quantifier
matches greedily). Since 1000 is not followed by a decimal point, the first
subexpression [0-9]+ will release the last 0 to match 100, but again it will
fail due to the missing decimal point. This process will be repeated until
the first subexpression [0-9]+ matches only one digit and the matcher fi-
nally decides that the input can not be matched by the regex (this matching
process is explained in more detail in Section 4.4). This takes unnecessar-
ily many steps, as the match will obviously fail due to the missing decimal
point. If the regex is converted to [0-9]++\.[0-9]++ , to make the plus
quantifiers possessive, the match will fail faster. After the nonnegative integer
1000 is matched with the first [0-9]++, the matcher disregards the informa-
tion that fewer digits could also have been matched. Consequently, when it
does not find the decimal point, the entire match fails immediately. Note that
the regex [0-9]++\.[0-9]++ can be converted into an equivalent regex using
atomic groups: (?>[0-9]+)\.(?>[0-9]+). In Chapter 11 atomic groups and
possessive quantifiers are investigated more thoroughly as a means to prevent
excessive matching time vulnerabilities in regexes.
3.4.6 Lookaround Assertions
Lookaround assertions allow for the placement of restrictions on prefixes (or
suffixes) starting (or ending) at specific positions in the input string. There are
four main types of lookaround assertions, namely positive or negative looka-
head or lookbehind assertions.
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Positive lookahead assertions assert that at some position in the input
string, an operand subexpression should match a prefix of the suffix starting
at that point. This is usually achieved by matching a prefix of the suffix of the
input string with the lookaround assertion, but if this match is successful, the
matching position in the input string is reset to the position before matching
with the lookahead assertion started. For example the regex (?=E1)E2, where
(?=E1) denotes a positive lookahead assertion using E1, describes the language
L(E1Σ∗) ∩ L(E2).
Similarly, positive lookbehind assertions assert that at some position in the
input string, a suffix of the currently matched substring, should be matched
by a given regex. For example the regex (E1(?<=E2)), where (?<=E2) denotes
a positive lookbehind assertion on E2, matches an input string precisely when
some suffix of a string matched by E1, can also be matched by E2.
The negative lookahead (denoted by (?!E1)) and negative lookbehind (de-
noted by (?<!E2)) assertions function similarly as their positive counterparts,
but instead assert that the operand subexpression should not match a prefix
or suffix at some position.
Java contains some predefined lookaround assertions, such as the word-
boundary assertion \b. The word-boundary assertion specifies that the matcher
should be between a word character and nonword character in the input string.
Other predefined lookaround assertions include the string anchor assertions.
The caret symbol (^) requires that the matcher should be at the beginning,
whereas the dollar symbol ($) specifies that the matcher should be at the end
of the input string.
3.5 Backreferences
Placing a backreference in a regex indicates that the substring matched by
some specified capturing group, is required to be matched again at the position
in which the backreference is placed. The capturing group to be used for the
backreference is denoted by using the syntax \i in the regex, where i is the ith
capturing group.
For example, [0-9]+.\d∗(\d+)\1+ can be used to match recurring decimal
numbers, such as 0.3, 0.81 and 0.045. The subexpression \d+ captures some
sequence of numbers matched in the input string and the backreference \1+
instructs the matcher to match this sequence again, one or more times.
Another motivating example for backreferences is found in [15], where a
regex similar to ([a-zA-Z]+)\1 is used to find occurrences where a word is
repeated immediately.
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3.6 Exact Matching and Submatching
In some cases an input string is said to be matched by a regex if the entire
input string is matched — this is referred to as exact matching. In other
cases, the input string is matched if some substring is matched, referred to as
submatching. It is possible to do exact matching by using submatching and
vice versa. Suppose that E is used for submatching and we want to replicate
submatching behaviour by using exact matching. We achieve this by using.∗?E.∗ in exact matching. Conversely, if we want to use E for exact matching
while assuming we have an algorithm or implementation for submatching, then
we simply add the string anchors ^and $ (see Section 3.4.6) to E and use ^E$.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed some of the extensions added to regular expres-
sions, and commonly supported in regex matching engines. We have shown
some extensions that provide only a notational convenience for regexes and
that can be expressed in regular expressions, but other extensions allow regexes
to match nonregular languages.
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Regex Matching
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we explore the two main algorithms used by regex matchers,
namely subset construction matching and backtracking matching. For back-
tracking matching we present a string-to-tree transducer model that allows us
to abstract the matching time behaviour of an implemented regex matcher.
4.2 Subset Versus Backtracking Matching
To explain the difference between subset construction matching and back-
tracking matching, consider a regex (wE | wF ), where L(E)∩L(F ) = ∅. While
attempting to match an input string, the matcher consumes the input string
one symbol at a time and consequently does not know beforehand whether the
match will ultimately be made with wE, wF , or not at all.
Subset construction matching traverses the different options in the regex
concurrently. Suppose the input string wv is used where v ∈ L(E), such that v
does not share a common nonempty prefix with any string in L(F ). Therefore,
the match will ultimately be made with the wE option in the alternation. While
matching the prefix w of the input string the matcher will note that both sides
of the alternation can still result in a possible match. Only when the matcher
reaches the first symbol of v, will it decide that F is no longer a valid option
(due to v not sharing any common nonempty prefix with a string in L(F )) and
only continue to match with E. Subset construction matching is explained in
more detail in Section 4.3.
Even though subset construction matching is relatively fast in the worst-
case, many regex engines opt to use backtracking matching, since backtracking
matching allows for a much more intuitive implementation of some regex ex-
tensions (that might be impossible to implement with the subset construction),
such as capturing groups and backreferences.
23
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q1 q2 q3
q4
q5
q6 q7
a ε
ε
ε
ε
b
b
c
Figure 4.1: An NFA recognising the language L(E) where E = a(b | b)∗c.
In the case of backtracking matching, for the same regex (wE | wF ) and
input string wv used earlier, rather than matching with both sides of the al-
ternation concurrently, a backtracking matcher will first attempt to match
with wE, and only if this is not possible, try to match with wF . Note that
a backtracking matcher prioritises matches made with certain subexpressions
over others. In the above example, the matcher prioritises a match with E
over a match with F . This method of matching is explained in more detail in
Section 4.4.
This example generalises to any type of choice in a regex. For example,
with a subexpression E∗, subset construction matching will traverse the input
string as if it matched E zero or more times, while backtracking matching will
match with E as many times as possible, noting each time that it could have
continued without matching another E.
4.3 Subset Construction Matching
The main idea of subset construction matching is to keep a set of possible
states in which the matcher currently could be, while reading the input string.
If one of these possible states is an accept state when the entire input string
has been read, the matcher accepts, otherwise it rejects. In doing this, the
matching process is determinised.
Consider the NFA depicted in Figure 4.1. The matcher will start in the set
of states containing only the initial state, namely {q1}. Upon reading an a from
the input string, the matcher will proceed to the set of states {q2, q3, q4, q5, q6}.
The matcher will remain in this set of states for every further b read from the
input string, until a c is read, which will take the matcher to {q7}. If the end
of input is reached when transitioning to {q7}, the matcher will accept.
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q1 q2 q3
q4
q5
q6 q7
a ε1
ε2
ε1
ε2
b
b
c
Figure 4.2: A pNFA recognising the language L(E) where E = a(b | b)∗c.
4.4 Backtracking Matching
Backtracking matching, in essence, is a depth-first search on the NFA corre-
sponding to the regex. The input string determines which symbol transitions
are traversed. The order in which the nondeterministic transitions are tra-
versed, is decided by the priority the matcher places on matches made with
certain subexpressions over others. To simulate backtracking matching we
need to ensure that for every input string and regex combination given to the
matcher, the underlying NFA follows exactly one path through the transitions
and states (including those backtracked from) to determine whether the input
string is accepted or not.
Therefore, for backtracking matching we need to ensure that there is at
most one accepting run (see Definition 2.3) in an NFA for a given input string,
in contrast to traditional NFAs. We can achieve the desired property by using
what is known as a prioritised-NFA (pNFA). When attempting to match an
input string, a pNFA adds priorities on ε-transitions from a specific state,
to indicate the order in which the backtracking matcher will traverse them.
Furthermore, the matcher will not attempt a lower priority path if a match
was found on a higher priority path. Figure 4.2 depicts a pNFA matching
the same language as the NFA depicted in Figure 4.1. We formally define the
concept of a pNFA next.
Definition 4.1 ([12]). A prioritised nondeterministic finite-state automaton
(pNFA) is a 7-tuple A = (Q1, Q2,Σ, q0, δ1, δ2, F ), where if Q := Q1 ∪ Q2, we
have:
1. Q1 and Q2 are disjoint finite sets of states such that Q 6= ∅,
2. Σ is the finite input alphabet,
3. δ1 : Q1 × Σ→ Q is the deterministic partial transition function,
4. δ2 : Q2 → Q∗ (where Q∗ is the set of strings over Q) is the nondetermin-
istic prioritised transition function,
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5. q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and
6. F ⊆ Q1 is the set of accept states.
We use the notation |δ2(p)|q to denote the number of occurrences of q in
δ2(p).
Definition 4.2. Let nfa(A) for a pNFA A = (Q1, Q2,Σ, q0, δ1, δ2, F ) be the
NFA A′ = (Q1 ∪ Q2,Σ, δ′, q0, F ), where δ′ is defined as follows. If p, q ∈
(Q1 ∪Q2) and α ∈ Σε (recall Σε = Σ ∪ {ε}), then
δ′(p, α, q) =
{
1 if p ∈ Q1 and δ1(p, α) = q
n if α = ε and p ∈ Q2 and n > 0 where n = |δ2(p)|q
That is, nfa(A) is the NFA obtained by removing the priorities on the ε-
transitions of the pNFA A.
Informally, for a pNFA, the sets Q1 and Q2 contain the states to be used
with the deterministic partial transition function δ1 and the nondeterminis-
tic prioritised transition function δ2, respectively. The function δ1 allows the
automaton to transition deterministically to the next state depending on the
next input symbol and models the behaviour of a backtracking matcher when
it consumes input symbols. The function δ2 allows the automaton to select the
next state nondeterministically from a sequence. The order in which a back-
tracking matcher will visit the subexpressions is modeled with the priorities
placed on the transitions in δ2.
4.4.1 Handling ε-transitions
When backtracking matching is used instead of subset construction matching,
special care needs to be taken when handling ε-transitions, especially when
encountering ε-loops.
In the model we use, no ε-transition is allowed to be used more than once
without consuming an input symbol since its previous use. In practice, some
matchers prevent infinite loops on ε-loops by restricting the reuse of only
certain ε-transitions (See Appendix A). However, to simulate this accurately
will result in a more complicated model.
Next we define (accepting) paths in pNFA.
Definition 4.3 ([12]). For a pNFA A = (Q1, Q2,Σ, q0, δ1, δ2, F ), a path for
w ∈ Σ∗ in A, is a run s0α1(j1)s1 . . . sn−1αn(jn)sn of w in nfa(A), such that
if αi = αi+1 = . . . = αm−1 = αm = ε, where i ≤ m, then (sk−1, jk, sk) =
(sl−1, jl, sl), where i ≤ k, l ≤ m, implies k = l. In other words, a path is not
allowed to repeat the same transition in a sequence of ε-transitions. For two
paths p = s0α1(j1)s1 . . . sn−1αn(jn)sn and p′ = s′0α′1(j′1)s′1 . . . s′m−1α′m(j′m)s′m
we say that p is of higher priority than p′, p > p′, if p 6= p′, piΣ(p) = piΣ(p′) and
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Table 4.1: The corresponding ε-transition in flat(A) for every δ2-path in A, where
A is the pNFA in Figure 4.3(a).
δ2-path in A ε-transition in flat(A)
q0
ε1−→ q1 ε1−→ q2 q0 ε1−→ q2
q0
ε1−→ q1 ε2−→ q0 ε2−→ q3 q0 ε2−→ q3
q0
ε2−→ q3 q0 ε3−→ q3
q1
ε1−→ q2 q1 ε1−→ q2
q1
ε2−→ q0 ε1−→ q1 ε1−→ q2 q1 ε2−→ q2
q1
ε2−→ q0 ε2−→ q3 q1 ε3−→ q3
either p′ is a proper prefix of p, or if k is the first index such that (jk)sk 6= (j′k)s′k,
then δ2(sk−1) = . . . sk . . . s′k . . . if sk 6= s′k, or sk = s′k and jk < j′k. An accepting
run for a pNFA A on w is the highest-priority path p = s0α1(j1)s1 . . . αn(jn)sn
such that piΣ(p) = w and sn ∈ F . The language accepted by A, denoted
by L(A), is the subset of Σ∗ defined by {piΣ(r) | r is an accepting run in A}.
Note that L(A) = L(nfa(A)).
To remove ε-loops from a pNFA A we define a pNFA flat(A) in Defini-
tion 4.6, which has matching time similar to that of A, but contains no ε-
loops. The pNFA flat(A) is obtained by replacing consecutive ε-transitions by
a single ε-transition without influencing the order on paths.
Definition 4.4 shows how to obtain maximum length subsequences of ε-
transitions by using the δ2-paths of A. If we replace each of these δ2-paths with
a single ε-transition of an appropriate priority, we obtain flat(A). Definition 4.5
can be used to determine appropriate priorities for the new ε-transitions in
flat(A). Figure 4.3 shows the result of performing the flattening procedure on
a pNFA A recognising the language (a∗)∗. To aid in the understanding of how
flat(A) is obtained from A, Table 4.1 shows the corresponding ε-transition in
flat(A) for every δ2-path in A. We extend the definition of flattening to NFAs
by proceeding in the same way as for pNFAs, but disregarding priorities at
each step.
Definition 4.4 ([16]). For a pNFA A, let rA(Q2) be the subset of Q2 defined
by Q2 ∩ ({q0} ∪ {δ1(q, α) | q ∈ Q1, α ∈ Σ}), i.e., all Q2 states reachable from a
Q1 state in one transition, and possibly also q0. A sequence p1j2p2 . . . pn−1jnpn,
where p1 ∈ rA(Q2), p2, . . . , pn−1 ∈ Q2, pn ∈ Q1, ji ∈ N, is a δ2-path if δ2(pi) =
. . . pi+1 . . ., δ2(pi) has at least ji+1 occurrences of pi+1, and (pi, ji+1, pi+1) =
(pk, jk+1, pk+1) only if i = k. Thus δ2-paths are maximum length subsequences
of distinct ε-transitions (that is, no ε-loops), obtained from paths in a pNFA.
We say p1 is the initial state of the δ2-path.
Definition 4.5 ([16]). We define the priority of a δ2-path relative to the other
δ2-paths with the same initial state as follows. For δ2-paths P := p1j2 . . . jnpn
and let P ′ = p′1j′2 . . . j′mp′m, where p1 = p′1, we define P > P ′ (that is, P
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has a higher priority than P ′) if the least i such that jipi 6= j′ip′i is such that
δ2(pi−1) = . . . pi . . . p′i . . . where pi 6= p′i, or pi = p′i but ji < j′i.
Definition 4.6 ([16]). We let flat(A) be (Q1, rT (Q2),Σ, q0, δ1, δ′2, F ), where
δ′2 is defined as follows. For q ∈ Q′2, let P1, . . . , Pn be all δ2-paths, ordered
according to priority, with initial state q and ending at a state in Q1. Then
δ′2(q) := q1 . . . qn, where qi is the last state in Pi.
It can be argued that for any input string, matching with A and flat(A)
will have similar matching times. Notice that each δ2-path in A is compressed
to a single ε-transition in flat(A), and thus backtracking matching with flat(A)
will traverse ε-transitions a constant factor number of times less than when
matching with A.
4.4.2 Modeling Backtracking Matching
The backtracking matching process can be modeled by constructing the im-
plicit depth-first search tree which is traversed when matching with the pNFA.
This can be achieved via the use of string-to-tree transducers. A string-to-tree
transducer is a finite state machine which takes a string as input and pro-
duces a tree as output. We define a string-to-tree transducer for the pNFA
associated with a regex such that given an input string, the output (of the
transducer) is the depth-first search tree traversed when using the regex to
match the corresponding input string.
Before defining string-to-tree transducers, we first define some related re-
quired concepts. A ranked alphabet Σ is the union Σ(0) ∪ Σ(1) ∪ Σ(2) . . . of
alphabets Σ(i), with only a finite number of the Σ(i) nonempty. For a symbol
f ∈ Σ(k), we say f has rank k. We allow symbols to have more than one rank,
that is Σ(0),Σ(1), . . . may not necessarily be pairwise disjoint. We emphasise
the rank of symbol f by writing f (k), when f has rank k. Trees are also ranked,
i.e., for a tree t where t : V → Σ, where V ⊆ N∗, we have that if v ∈ V then
vi ∈ V , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where k is one of the possible ranks of t(v). Recall
that |t| = |V | denotes the size of t. Also, let |t|S = |{v ∈ V | t(v) ∈ S}|, for
S ⊆ Σ, be the number of occurrences of symbols from S in t. For notational
convenience we write trees where t(v) ∈ Σ(0)∪Σ(1) for all v ∈ V , as α1α2 . . . αn,
where αi ∈ Σ(1) for i < n and αn ∈ Σ(0). Given a ranked alphabet ∆, the set
of all ranked trees t : tD → ∆ is denoted by T∆. Moreover, if Q is an alphabet
disjoint from ∆, we let T∆(Q) := T∆∪Q where Q = Q(0), i.e., the symbols in Q
appear only at the leaves.
Next we formally define string-to-tree transducers.
Definition 4.7. A string-to-tree transducer is a 5-tuple td = (Q,Γ,∆, I, δ),
where
1. Γ = Γ(0) ∪ Γ(1) and ∆ are finite ranked input and output alphabets
respectively,
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2. Q is a finite set of states disjoint from ∆,
3. I ⊆ Q the initial states, and
4. δ ⊆ (Q× Γ(0) × T∆) ∪ (Q× Γ(1)ε × T∆(Q)) is the transition relation.
Also, |td|δ :=
∑
(q,α,t)∈δ |t| is the transition size of td.
When (q, α1, t), (q, α2, t), . . . , (q, αn, t) ∈ δ, we write q α1,α2,...,αn−−−−−−→ t; for
(q, ε, t) ∈ δ, we write q → t; for rules such as q α−→ t1, q α−→ t2, q α−→ t3,
we write q α−→ t1 | t2 | t3, and lastly, for q → t1, q → t2, q → t3, we write
q → t1 | t2 | t3.
For w ∈ TΓ, the set of output trees, when applying td to w, is denoted
by td(w) ⊆ T∆, and defined as follows. We have that t ∈ td(w) if w can be
written as α1 . . . αn, where αi ∈ Γ(1)ε for i < n and αn ∈ Γ(0), such that there
exists a sequence of trees t0, . . . , tn ∈ T∆(Q) where t0 ∈ I and tn = t; and for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti is obtained from ti−1 by replacing every leaf v for which
ti−1(v) ∈ Q with any tree t′ such that ti−1(v) αi−→ t′.
A backtracking transducer is a string-to-tree transducer constructed for a
pNFA in such a way that given an input string, an output tree consisting of
the states traversed during the matching process is returned. Given an input
string that is accepted by the pNFA, this is achieved by creating an output
tree in which the rightmost branch corresponds to the accepting path in the
pNFA. Independent of if the input string is accepted or not, the branches
(in the output tree) to the left of the rightmost branch, correspond to higher
priority paths in the pNFA which were traversed and backtracked from. For
convenience, we assume all input strings have a $ as end of string marker, and
that $ is not contained within the alphabet over which strings are defined.
A backtracking transducer incorporates the ε-transitions that have been
traversed subsequent to the previous symbol transition in its states. In doing
this, it is possible to avoid ε-loops by disallowing the traversal of an ε-transition
if it is already contained within the state. To simplify the incorporation of ε-
transitions into the states, we assume there are no parallel transitions present
in the pNFA. This allows us to represent a traversed ε-transition with a tuple
(p, q) where p and q are the source and target state of the transition, respec-
tively.
Example 4.1. To illustrate the concept of incorporating ε-transitions into
the states of a backtracking transducer, we give the backtracking transducer
associated with the pNFA A, recognising the language L(E) with E = (a∗)∗,
shown in Figure 4.3(a). We have that tdA = (Q,Γ,∆, {a(q0,∅), f(q0,∅)}, δ), where
Q = {a(q,r), f(q,r) | q ∈ Q′, r ∈ P(Q′×Q′)}, where Q′ = {q0, q1, q2, q3} being the
set of states of the pNFA A, Γ = {a, b, $} and ∆ = Q′∪{} = {q0, q1, q2, q3, }.
The transition rules are:
a(q0,∅) → q0[a(q1,{(q0,q1)})] | q0[f(q1,{(q0,q1)}), a(q3,{(q0,q3)})],
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. REGEX MATCHING 30
(a)
q0
q1q2
q3
ε1
ε2
ε2
ε1
a (b)
q0
q1q2
q3
ε1
ε2, ε3
ε3
ε1, ε2
a
Figure 4.3: (a) A pNFA A recognising the language L(E) where E = (a∗)∗ and
(b) flat(A).
f(q0,∅) → q0[f(q1,{(q0,q1)}), f(q3,{(q0,q3)})],
a(q1,∅) → q1[a(q2,{(q1,q2)})] | q1[f(q2,{(q1,q2)}), a(q0,{(q1,q0)})],
f(q1,∅) → q1[f(q2,{(q1,q2)}), f(q0,{(q1,q0)})],
a(q0,{(q1,q0)}) → q0[a(q1,{(q1,q0),(q0,q1)})] | q0[f(q1,{(q1,q0),(q0,q1)}), a(q3,{(q1,q0),(q0,q3)})],
f(q0,{(q1,q0)}) → q0[f(q1,{(q1,q0),(q0,q1)}), f(q3,{(q1,q0),(q0,q3)})],
a(q1,{(q0,q1)}) → q1[a(q2,{(q0,q1),(q1,q2)})] | q1[f(q2,{(q0,q1),(q1,q2)}), a(q0,{(q0,q1),(q1,q0)})],
f(q1,{(q0,q1)}) → q1[f(q2,{(q0,q1),(q1,q2)}), f(q0,{(q0,q1),(q1,q0)})],
a(q0,{(q0,q1),(q1,q0)}) → q0[a(q3,{(q0,q1),(q1,q0),(q0,q3)})],
f(q0,{(q0,q1),(q1,q0)}) → q0[f(q3,{(q0,q1),(q1,q0),(q0,q3)})],
a(q1,{(q1,q0),(q0,q1)}) → q1[a(q2,{(q1,q0),(q0,q1),(q1,q2)})],
f(q1,{(q1,q0),(q0,q1)}) → q1[f(q2,{(q1,q0),(q0,q1),(q1,q2)})],
a(q2,{(q1,q2)})
a−→ q2[a(q1,∅)],
f(q2,{(q1,q2)})
a−→ q2[f(q1,∅)],
f(q2,{(q1,q2)})
b,$−→ q2[],
a(q2,{(q0,q1),(q1,q2)})
a−→ q2[a(q1,∅)],
f(q2,{(q0,q1),(q1,q2)})
a−→ q2[f(q1,∅)],
f(q2,{(q1,q2),(q1,q2)})
b,$−→ q2[],
a(q2,{(q0,q1),(q1,q2)})
a−→ q2[a(q1,∅)],
f(q2,{(q0,q1),(q1,q2)})
a−→ q2[f(q1,∅)],
f(q2,{(q1,q0),(q0,q1),(q1,q2)})
b,$−→ q2[],
a(q3,{(q0,q3)})
$−→ q3[],
a(q3,{(q1,q0),(q0,q3)})
$−→ q3[],
a(q3,{(q0,q1),(q1,q0),(q0,q3)})
$−→ q3[].
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The intuition behind backtracking transducers is that states a(q,r) and f(q,r)
are used to model accepting and rejecting paths respectively. More specifically,
transitions originating from states a(q,r) produce subtrees with the rightmost
branch corresponding to an accepting path, while transitions from f(q,r) pro-
duce subtrees corresponding to paths which are all rejecting. Specifically, con-
sider the rules a(q0,∅) → q0[a(q1,{(q0,q1)})] and a(q0,∅) → q0[f(q1,{(q0,q1)}), a(q3,{(q0,q3)})].
The rule a(q0,∅) → q0[a(q1,{(q0,q1)})] represents the case in which there is an ac-
cepting path starting with a transition from q0 to q1. Conversely, the rule
a(q0,∅) → q0[f(q1,{(q0,q1)})a(q3,{(q0,q3)})] represents the case in which the matcher
failed to find a match by following the q0 to q1 transition (the higher priority
transition), but eventually backtracked and accepted the input string by rather
following the q0 to q3 transition.
Having to account for ε-loops in the states of a backtracking transducer can
be very burdensome, resulting in state machines with potentially exponentially
many more states and transitions than the corresponding pNFA. A possible
workaround is to construct a backtracking transducer rather for flat(A) if A
is a pNFA with ε-loops. By definition, flat(A) does not contain any ε-loops
and therefore, a less convoluted backtracking transducer can be constructed
therefor. Note, since we no longer keep track of ε-transitions in the states of
the transducer, we do not require the assumption that we only consider pNFA
without parallel transitions.
Example 4.2. As an example of a backtracking transducer for a pNFA with-
out ε-loops, we now give the backtracking transducer for the pNFA flat(A)
shown in Figure 4.3(b). We have that tdA = (Q,Γ,∆, {aq0 , fq0}, δ), where
Q = {aq, fq | q ∈ {q0, q1, q2, q3}}, Γ = {a, b, $} and ∆ = {qi | i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}} ∪
{}. The transition rules are:
aq0 → q0[aq2 ] | q0[fq2 , aq3 ] | q0[fq2 , fq3 , aq3 ], fq0 → q0[fq2 , fq3 , fq3 ],
aq1 → q1[aq2 ] | q1[fq2 , aq2 ] | q1[fq2 , fq2 , aq3 ], fq1 → q1[fq2 , fq2 , fq3 ],
aq2
a−→ q1[aq1 ], fq2 a−→ q1[fq1 ], fq2 b,$−→ q1[],
aq3
$−→ q3[].
A more intuitive representation of the transition rules for tdA is shown in
Figure 4.4. In the figure we use the notation tdq(w) to denote the transducer
constructed for a pNFA similar to td, with the only difference being that the
initial state for the pNFA corresponding to tdq(w), is state q. The backtracking
tree produced when using the input strings ab and aab is shown in Figures 4.5
and 4.6 respectively.
Example 4.3. As another example of a backtracking transducer for a pNFA
without ε-loops, we give the backtracking transducer for the pNFA A shown
in Figure 4.2. We have that tdA = (Q,Γ,∆, {aq1 , fq1}, δ), where
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(a)
td(anb) = q0
tdq2 (anb) q3 q3
 
(b)
tdq2 (anb) = q2
tdq1 (an−1b)
(c)
tdq2 (b) = q2

(d)
tdq1 (anb) = q1
tdq2 (anb) tdq2 (anb) q3

Figure 4.4: The backtracking transducer for the pNFA shown in Figure 4.3(b), in
terms of transducers tdq1 and tdq2 , for input of the form anb.
q0
q2 q3

q3

q1
q2

q2

q3

Figure 4.5: The backtracking tree produced when giving the input string ab to the
backtracking transducer of Figure 4.4.
Q = {aq, fq | q ∈ {q0, q1, q2, . . . , q7}}, Γ = {a, b, c, d, $} and ∆ = {qi | i ∈
N, 0 ≤ i ≤ 7} ∪ {}. The transition rules are:
aq1
a−→ q1[aq2 ], fq1 a−→ q1[fq2 ], fq1 b,c,d,$−−−→ q1[],
aq2 → q2[aq3 ] | q2[fq3 , aq4 ], fq2 → q2[fq3 , fq4 ],
aq3 → q3[aq4 ] | q3[fq4 , aq5 ], fq3 → q3[fq4 , fq5 ],
aq4
b−→ q4[aq2 ], fq4 a−→ q4[fq2 ], fq4 b,c,d,$−−−→ q4[],
aq5
b−→ q5[aq2 ], fq5 a−→ q5[fq2 ], fq5 b,c,d,$−−−→ q5[],
aq6
c−→ q6[aq2 ], fq6 a−→ q6[fq2 ], fq6 b,c,d,$−−−→ q6[],
aq7
$−→ q7[].
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q0
q2 q3

q3

q1
q2 q2 q3

q1 q1
q2

q2

q3

q2

q2

q3

Figure 4.6: The backtracking tree produced when giving the input string aab to
the backtracking transducer of Figure 4.4.
As with Example 4.2 we provide a more intuitive representation of the
transition rules for tdA for input strings of the form abnd and abnc are shown
in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 respectively, and the backtracking trees produced when
using input strings abc and abd are shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.10.
Finally, let us define the backtracking transducer tdA associated with a
pNFA A formally. To simplify the formal definition we assume A has no ε-
loops (if A has ε-loops, we replace it with flat(A) instead).
Definition 4.8. For a pNFA A = (Q1, Q2,Σ, q0, δ1, δ2, F ), the backtracking
transducer tdA = (Q,Γ,∆, {aq0 , fq0}, δ) is defined as follows. Q = {aq, fq | q ∈
Q1 ∪Q2}, Γ(0) = {$}, Γ(1) = Σ (we assume $ 6∈ Σ), and ∆ = Q1 ∪Q2 ∪ {(0)}.
Furthermore, δ consists of the following transitions:
1. For q ∈ Q1 and α ∈ Σ:
a) If δ1(q, α) = q′ let aq
α−→ q[aq′ ] and fq α−→ q[fq′ ].
b) If δ1(q, α) is undefined, fq
α−→ q[].
2. For q ∈ Q2, if δ2(q) = q1 . . . qn, then aq → q[fq1 , . . . , fqi , aqi+1 ] where
0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, and fq → q[fq1 , . . . , fqn ].
3. Finally, if q ∈ F , aq $−→ q[], whereas when q ∈ Q1 \ F , let fq $−→ q[].
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(a)
td(abnd) = q1
tdq2 (bnd)
(b)
tdq2 (bnd) = q2
tdq3 (bnd) tdq6 (bnd)
(c)
tdq3 (bnd) = q3
tdq4 (bnd) tdq5 (bnd)
(d)
tdq4 (bnd) = q4
tdq2 (bn−1d)
(e)
tdq4 (d) = q4

(f)
tdq5 (bnd) = q5
tdq2 (bn−1d)
(g)
tdq5 (d) = q5

(h)
tdq6 (bnd) = q6

(i)
tdq6 (d) = q6
q7

Figure 4.7: The backtracking transducer for the pNFA shown in Figure 4.2, in
terms of transducers tdq2 , tdq3 , tdq4 , tdq5 and tdq6 , for (rejected) input strings of the
form abnd. Note that in (a), (b), (c) and (h) we assume n ≥ 0, while in (d) and (f)
we assume n ≥ 1.
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(a)
td(abnc) = q1
tdq2 (bnc)
(b)
tdq2 (bnc) = q2
tdq3 (bnc)
(c)
tdq2 (c) = q2
tdq3 (c) tdq6 (c)
(d)
tdq3 (bnc) = q3
tdq4 (bnc)
(e)
tdq3 (c) = q3
tdq4 (c) tdq5 (c)
(f)
tdq4 (bnc) = q4
tdq2 (bn−1d)
(g)
tdq4 (c) = q4

(h)
tdq5 (bnc) = q5
tdq2 (bn−1c)
(i)
tdq5 (c) = q5

(j)
tdq6 (bnc) = q6

(k)
tdq6 (c) = q6
q7

Figure 4.8: The backtracking transducer for the pNFA shown in Figure 4.2, in
terms of transducers tdq2 , tdq3 , tdq4 , tdq5 and tdq6 , for (accepted) input strings of the
form abnc.
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q1
q2
q3 q6

q4 q5
q2 q2
q3 q6

q3 q6

q4

q5

q4

q5

Figure 4.9: The backtracking tree produced when giving the input string abd to
the backtracking transducer of Figure 4.7.
q1
q2
q3
q4
q2
q3 q6
q4

q5

q7

Figure 4.10: The backtracking tree produced when giving the input string abc to
the backtracking transducer of Figure 4.8.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduced two common matching techniques used by regex en-
gines. We discussed the main differences between subset construction matching
and backtracking matching. We also explained how a backtracking matcher
can be modeled using pNFAs and backtracking transducers.
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Chapter 5
Context and Related Work
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we discuss the practical significance of vulnerable regexes. We
present the context of ReDoS in the field of information security and point out
the rather limited amount of related research.
5.2 Algorithmic Complexity Attacks
An algorithmic complexity attack is an exploit on some target algorithm, aim-
ing to trigger the worst-case execution time. If the worst-case execution time is
significantly slower than the average case, the attack could cause a state of de-
nial of service in the incorporating program. An algorithmic complexity attack
is a type of denial of service attack known as a sophisticated denial of service
attack. The difference between the standard denial of service attack and its
sophisticated counterpart, is that for the sophisticated case, the attacker does
not have to send a vast amount of network traffic in order to launch a success-
ful attack [17]. This is usually achieved by exploiting a vulnerability, rather
than simply overpowering the victim with superior computational power.
Algorithmic complexity attacks on hash tables provide a well-known class
of examples. A hash table guarantees constant lookup and insertion time on
average, which is achieved by mapping an object to be inserted, with a hash
function, to an index in the table. If a malicious user knows the specific hash
function being used, it might be possible to cause multiple collisions in the
hash table (i.e., having many insertions at the same index). This will cause
the insertion and lookup time to become linear, instead of being constant and
could potentially slow down the normal functionality of the software under con-
sideration. For a more in-depth discussion of algorithmic complexity attacks
on hash tables, refer to [18].
The algorithmic complexity attack relevant to our research is an exploit
of the matching algorithm used in backtracking regular expression matchers.
38
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. CONTEXT AND RELATED WORK 39
This attack is known as ReDoS.
5.3 Regular Expression Denial of Service
ReDoS is an algorithmic complexity attack on backtracking regular expression
matchers. The main idea is to submit a specially crafted input string to be
matched by a vulnerable regex, which will force the matcher to cause a denial
of service. This is usually achieved by exploiting a highly ambiguous regex in
such a way that the matcher is forced to try a vast number of possible ways to
match a specific input string. To achieve this, a substring is constructed that
can be matched in many possible ways by a subexpression of the regex, due
to the ambiguity present in the regex. This substring is then used as part of
a larger input string, where the input string is constructed in such a way to
force the matcher to try all possible ways of matching the substring.
ReDoS is of practical importance due to the widespread use of regexes.
For example, many intrusion detection systems (IDS) use regexes to analyse
the contents of data packets entering a network. If one of these regexes are
vulnerable, ReDoS could potentially be used to disable the IDS, leaving the
network open to other attacks, as shown by [19].
Other than denial of service, it can also be possible in some circumstances
to exploit vulnerable regexes to expose sensitive data. This is achieved by
using the slow matching time of vulnerable regexes as the base of a timing
attack. We discuss a possible timing attack such as this in Appendix B.
5.4 Related Work
Performing static analysis on regexes to estimate the worst-case matching time
is a problem that has not yet received much attention in the scientific literature.
The concept of ReDoS is explained broadly in [20] and [21], but they only
scratch the surface in terms of theory before taking a more practical view.
Some examples and experimental results concerning slow matching time are
shown in [22].
Our approach is built on ideas from [23], where it is described how to use
pNFAs (in theory) to identify regexes with exponential matching time [23].
The authors show how pNFAs can be constructed from regexes to simulate
the regex matching algorithm found in Java. Furthermore, they explain how
the method of pNFA construction used, affects the input strings for which an
evil regex is vulnerable.
The authors in [24] approach the problem of identifying vulnerable regexes
by creating an abstract syntax tree (AST) from a regex, which is then used to
construct an equivalent NFA. For this NFA an abstract machine is constructed,
that allows for the modeling of backtracking regex matchers. The static anal-
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ysis then proceeds to search over this abstract machine for paths indicating
exponential matching time. This analysis, however, does not address some
of the more in-depth issues related to estimating worst-case matching time
of backtracking matchers. One such issue is how the fact that certain back-
tracking matchers prioritise some matches over others and cease the matching
process as soon as a match has been found, affects the vulnerability of a regex.
These complications introduced by prioritisation during the matching process,
is addressed in [25], by using the concept of an ordered NFA. An ordered NFA
is very similar to a pNFA. The difference between these two models, is that the
ordered NFA does not use ε-transitions, prioritised or otherwise. Instead, an
ordered NFA uses ordered multistates to define an order over the destination
states of each transition from a state, for an input symbol. Similar to the pri-
oritised ε-transitions of a pNFA, this order prioritises certain matches above
others. However, the exclusion of ε-transitions in an ordered NFA eliminates
the need to remove ε-loops. They also describe how to find strings that trigger
the exponential matching time.
In [26] and [27] a problem known as the output size problem for string-
to-tree transducers is discussed. The output size problem for string-to-tree
transducers is to determine the rate of growth of the largest possible output
tree in relation to the length of an input string, for a string-to-tree transducer.
It is shown that this problem is related to determining the worst-case matching
time of a regex for some backtracking regex matcher. It uses the results on NFA
ambiguity from [14] to approximate the output size of a given string-to-tree
transducer in certain cases.
Our main contribution to the body of research dealing with ReDoS is the
development of static analysis techniques to reveal both high-degree polyno-
mial and exponential matching time.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed algorithmic complexity attacks in general and also fo-
cused on the practical importance of investigating ReDoS.
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Chapter 6
Linking Regexes, Ambiguity and
Matching Time
6.1 Introduction
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 we explained the concepts of ambiguity of NFAs, regexes
and backtracking matching. In this chapter we describe in more detail the link
between all these concepts. This is accomplished by defining two types of
regex ambiguity and describing a regex-to-NFA construction which preserves
both kinds of ambiguity. We define weak and strong ambiguity as a gener-
alisation of the concepts defined in [28], and [29], respectively. In [30], both
concepts are discussed and contrasted. We also show how to construct pNFAs,
from regexes, in order to model the matching time of the Java regex matcher.
6.2 Weak Ambiguity
The term weak ambiguity of a regex relates to how the symbols of an input
string can be matched by the corresponding symbols in the regex. A weakly
unambiguous regex can match the symbols of an input string with the corre-
sponding symbols in the regex in at most one way. A regex is weakly ambigu-
ous if it is not weakly unambiguous. For an example of a weakly unambiguous
regex, consider the regex E1 = a∗. For every input string ak, each of the k a
symbols can only be matched by the a symbol in E1, and therefore the regex
E1 is weakly unambiguous. Conversely, consider the regex E2 = (a | a). The
input string a can be matched by any of the two branches in the alternation
of E2, and consequently, E2 is weakly ambiguous.
To define weak ambiguity formally, we first give Definition 6.1, which is used
to annotate regexes. Recall from Chapter 2 that subexpressions in a regex E
are numbered in a depth-first preorder. We use E(i) to denote subexpression
i of the regex E (e.g. for E = ((ab) | b)∗ we have E(1) = E, E(3) = ab and
E(4) = a).
41
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Definition 6.1. For a regex E over the alphabet Σ (with Σ ∩ N = ∅) define
YwA(E) by replacing subexpression E(i) with i · E(i) if E(i) ∈ Σ. That is,
YwA(E) is a regex over Σ ∪ N.
Using Definition 6.1, we define weak ambiguity next.
Definition 6.2. For a regex E let
wAE(n) = max
w∈Σ∗,|w|≤n
|{v ∈ L(YwA(E)) | piΣ(v) = w}|.
wAE is the degree of weak ambiguity of E. If wAE(n) ≤ 1 for all n, E is
weakly unambiguous. If there exists a constant c such that wAE(n) ≤ c, E has
constant weak ambiguity. If wAE(n) is a polynomial function in n of degree d,
with d ≥ 1, then E has infinite degree of weak ambiguity of degree d. Similarly,
if wAE(n) is an exponential function in n, then E has exponential degree of
weak ambiguity.
We illustrate the previous definition with the regex E2 = (a | a). Note that
YwA(E2) = (2a | 3a) and since YwA(E2) matches w1 = 2a and w2 = 3a, E2 is
weakly ambiguous, as piΣ(w1) = piΣ(w2) = a.
To illustrate the concepts of infinite and exponential degree of weak am-
biguity, first consider the regex E3 = a∗a∗. Then YwA(E3) = (3a)∗(5a)∗, and
YwA(E3) matches strings of the form (3a)n0(5a)n1 , with n0, n1 ≥ 0. Since
piΣ((3a)n0(5a)n1) = an0+n1 , wAE3(n) = n + 1 and E3 has weak ambiguity of
degree 1.
For the case of exponential degree of ambiguity, consider the regex E4 =
(a | a)∗. The annotated regex YwA(E4) = (3a | 4a)∗ matches 2n strings v such
that piΣ(v) = an, and thus E4 has exponential degree of weak ambiguity.
6.3 Glushkov Construction
Glushkov’s construction algorithm [30; 31] operates over a set of positions in
a regex, along with functions defined to describe the behaviour of the regex.
It constructs an automaton which preserves weak ambiguity of a regex. We
denote this automaton, constructed from regex E, as Gl(E).
The set of positions in a regex E is obtained by adding a unique subscript
to each subexpression that is a symbol from Σ, forming regex E ′. This idea
is similar to the concept of annotating regexes as iE(i) for each subexpression
E(i), introduced in the previous sections, but where the previous method of
annotation changed the language matched by the regex, adding subscripts
does not. Formally, pos(E) = {i | E(i) ∈ Σ} denotes the set of positions
of E. For example, to the regex E = a(b | c)∗d, subscripts are added as in
E ′ = a2(b6 | c7)∗d8, and pos(E) = {2, 6, 7, 8}. Let χR(x) denote the symbol in
regex R at position x, for example, χE′(2) = a.
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To describe the matching behaviour of a regex, the functions first, last and
follow are defined. The function first(E ′) maps the regex E ′ to the positions of
symbols that can match the first symbol of some input string. In our previous
example with the regex E ′, first(E ′) = {2} and for regexes such as (a2 | b3) and
(a3∗b4), first(E ′) = {2, 3} and first(E ′) = {3, 4}, respectively. Similarly, the
function last(E ′) maps the regex E ′ to the positions at which some input string
w ∈ L(E) can be accepted. In the case of the regex E ′, last(E ′) = {8} and for
regexes such as (a2 | b3) and (a2b4∗), last(E ′) = {2, 3} and last(E ′) = {2, 4},
respectively.
The function follow(E ′, x), where x ∈ pos(E), describes the behaviour of
the regex while symbols from Σ are being read. It maps a position x in the
regex to a set of positions that can be reached from position x when reading
a symbol from Σ. In our example, follow(E ′, 2) = {6, 7, 8}, follow(E ′, 6) =
{6, 7, 8}, follow(E ′, 7) = {6, 7, 8} and follow(E ′, 8) = ∅.
Obtaining these functions are trivial for simple regexes, but in general,
these functions need to be built up recursively, similarly to how an automaton
is built recursively from a given regex. This can be achieved using Defini-
tions 6.3 to 6.7.
Definition 6.3 ([30]). (Empty string recognising regex, E ′ = ε)
We define:
1. first(E ′) = ∅,
2. last(E ′) = ∅, and
3. since, pos(E) = ∅, the follow function is not defined.
Definition 6.4 ([30]). (Single symbol string recognising regex, E ′ = αi)
We define:
1. first(E ′) = {i},
2. last(E ′) = {i}, and
3. follow(E ′, i) = ∅.
Definition 6.5 ([30]). (Union of two regexes E ′ = F ′ |G′)
Let pos(E) = pos(F )∪pos(G) and we assume pos(F )∩pos(G) = ∅. We define:
1. first(E ′) = first(F ′) ∪ first(G′),
2. last(E ′) = last(F ′) ∪ last(G′), and
3. for x ∈ pos(E),
follow(E ′, x) =
{
follow(F ′, x) if x ∈ pos(F );
follow(G′, x) if x ∈ pos(G).
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Definition 6.6 ([30]). (Concatenation of two regexes E ′ = F ′G′)
Let pos(E) = pos(F )∪pos(G) and we assume pos(F )∩pos(G) = ∅. We define:
1. first(E ′) =
{
first(F ′) ∪ first(G′) ε ∈ L(F );
first(F ′) otherwise;
2. last(E ′) =
{
last(F ′) ∪ last(G′) ε ∈ L(G);
last(G′) otherwise;
3. for x ∈ pos(E),
follow(E ′, x) =

follow(F ′, x) x ∈ pos(F ) \ last(F ′);
follow(F ′, x) ∪ first(G′) x ∈ last(F ′);
follow(G′, x) x ∈ pos(G).
Definition 6.7 ([30]). (Kleene star of a regex E ′ = F ′∗)
We define:
1. first(E ′) = first(F ′),
2. last(E ′) = last(F ′), and
3. for x ∈ pos(E),
follow(E ′, x) =
{
follow(F ′, x) x ∈ pos(F ) \ last(F ′);
follow(F ′, x) ∪ first(F ′) x ∈ last(F ′).
Using the positions of a regex, along with the definitions of first, last and
follow, an automaton can be created using Definition 6.8.
Definition 6.8. Glushkov’s Construction
From the positions and definitions of the functions first, last and follow,
Glushkov’s construction creates an NFA A = (Q,Σ, δ, qI, F ) from a regex E.
Assume E ′ is regex E with subscripts added from pos(E):
1. Q = {qi for i ∈ pos(E)} ∪ {qI}, i.e. the states of A are the positions of
E with a new state qI.
2. For α ∈ Σ let δ(qI, α) = {qx|x ∈ first(E ′), χE′(x) = α}.
3. For α ∈ Σ and x ∈ pos(E), let δ(qx, α) = {qy|y ∈ follow(E ′, x), χE′(y) =
α}.
4. F =
{
last(E ′) ∪ {qI} if ε ∈ L(A);
last(E ′) otherwise.
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qI q2
a
a
Figure 6.1: The automaton Gl(E1) for the regex E1 = a∗.
As an example of Glushkov construction, we construct the NFA Gl(E1),
where E1 = a∗ and E ′1 = a2∗. For E1, first(E ′1) = {2}, last(E ′1) = {2} and
follow(E ′1, 2) = {2}. The NFA Gl(E1) is shown in Figure 6.1.
To illustrate via an example that the Glushkov construction preserves weak
ambiguity, we consider the weakly ambiguous regex E2 = (a | a)∗. First, we
add subscripts to E2, E ′2 = (a3 | a4)∗. Then using E ′2, we calculate first(E ′2) =
last(E ′2) = follow(E ′2, 3) = follow(E ′2, 4) = {3, 4}. The automaton Gl(E2)
is shown in Figure 6.2. Note that by using the definitions of ambiguity for
regexes and ambiguity for automata found in Section 2.7, we see that the regex
E2 has exponential degree of weak ambiguity and Gl(E2) also has exponential
ambiguity.
qI
q3
q4
a
a
a
a
a
a
Figure 6.2: The NFA Gl(E2) for the regex E2 = (a | a)∗.
6.4 Strong Ambiguity
Weak ambiguity of regexes is insufficient to encompass accurately all the in-
tricacies of the ambiguity found in automata obtained from regexes, by using
for example Thompson construction (discussed in Section 6.5). Therefore, we
define another type of regex ambiguity, namely strong ambiguity. Strong ambi-
guity of a regex relates to how the symbols of an input string are matched with
all the subexpressions of the regex. First we define how regexes are annotated
for strong ambiguity.
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Definition 6.9. For a regex E over the alphabet Σ (with Σ ∩ N = ∅) define
the regex YsA(E) by replacing subexpression E(i) with i ·E(i), for each i. That
is, YsA(E) is a regex over Σ ∪ {1, . . . , |E|}.
Further, let L =
⋃{(Σ ∪ N)∗xN∗x(Σ ∪ N)∗ | x ∈ N}, and define XsA(E) =
L(YsAE) ∩ L, where L is all strings not in L.
Intuitively, XsA(E) is the strings of L(E) annotated with the subexpres-
sions which can be visited during the matching, except disallowing visiting the
same subexpression twice without reading a symbol from Σ in between (en-
forced by the intersection with L). This mimics the behaviour of Definition 4.3
in terms of disallowing ε-transition repetitions, and hence the backtracking
matching behaviour in terms of avoiding infinite loops. Next we define the
degree of strong ambiguity of a regex.
Definition 6.10. For a regex E let
sAE(n) = max
w∈Σ∗,|w|≤n
|{v ∈ XsA(E) | piΣ(v) = w}|.
sAE is the degree of strong ambiguity of E (where the max over the empty set
is taken to be 0). If sAE(n) ≤ 1 for all n, E is strongly unambiguous. If there
exists a constant c such that sAE(n) ≤ c, E has constant strong ambiguity. If
sAE(n) is a polynomial function in n of degree d, then E has infinite degree
of strong ambiguity of degree d. Similarly, if sAE is an exponential function,
then E has exponential degree of strong ambiguity. Note that any strongly
unambiguous regex will also be weakly unambiguous.
To illustrate the concept of strong ambiguity, consider the regex E5 =
(ε | a)∗. First we create the annotated regex YsA(E5) = 1(2(3ε | 4a))∗, which
matches w1 = 124a24a and w2 = 124a24a23, and thus since piΣ(w1) = piΣ(w2) =
aa, E5 has strong ambiguity. Note that, by definition of YsA, a string such as
124a2324a is not included in XsA(E5), due to presence of the substring 232.
In general, XsA(E5) contains strings of the forms 1(24a)n and 1(24a)n23, and
and therefore E5 has constant strong ambiguity.
In contrast, E5 is weakly unambiguous, since YwA(E5) = (ε | 4a)∗ matches
only strings of the form wn = (4a)n. Indeed, the automaton Gl(E5) is the
same as Gl(E1) given in Section 6.3, with E1 = a∗. To show this, let us use the
subscript 2 for E5(4) = a instead of 4, E ′5 = (ε | a2)∗. This yields, for the regex
E5, first(E ′5) = last(E ′5) = follow(E ′5, 2) = {2}. Since first(E ′1) = first(E ′5),
last(E ′1) = last(E ′5) and follow(E ′1, 2) = follow(E ′5, 2), both regexes will have
the same Glushkov automaton, and thus the Glushkov construction does not
preserve strong ambiguity.
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(a)
q0 q1
E1
(b)
q0 q1 q2 q3
E1 ε E2
(c)
q0
q1 q2
q3 q4
q5
ε
ε
E1
ε
E2
ε
(d)
q0 q1 q2 q3ε
ε
E1
ε
ε
Figure 6.3: Thompson NFAs for (a) Th(E1), (b) Th(E1 ·E2), (c) Th(E1 | E2) and
(d) Th(E∗1).
6.5 Thompson Construction
Another well-known regex-to-NFA construction method is Thompson’s
method [32]. This method preserves strong ambiguity of regexes, unlike
Glushkov’s construction. Given a regex E, we use Th(E) to denote the NFA
obtained by using Thompson construction. The construction of Th(E), when
using concatenation, alternation and the Kleene star operator, is shown in
Figure 6.3.
To illustrate the strong ambiguity preserving feature of Thompson con-
struction, we use the regex E5 = (ε | a)∗, which was shown to be strongly
ambiguous in Section 6.4. We show Th(E5) in Figure 6.4(a). The automaton
Th(E5) is ambiguous, as there are multiple paths for reading the input string a.
Two of these paths are q0
ε−→ q1 ε−→ q2 ε−→ q3 ε−→ q4 ε−→ q1 ε−→ q6 a−→ q7 ε−→ q4 ε−→ q5
and q0
ε−→ q1 ε−→ q6 a−→ q7 ε−→ q4 ε−→ q5. If we disallow the repeated usage of
ε-transitions without reading any input symbols, this automaton has constant
degree of ambiguity. After the first a symbol has been read, the automaton
can only be in state q1 if the q4
ε−→ q1 transition has been traversed. Therefore,
the q1
ε−→ q2 ε−→ q3 ε−→ q4 ε−→ q1 loop can only be traversed once at the start of
the input string (before the first a symbol has been read). We can simulate the
prevention of repeated ε-transition usage, by removing the ε-loops of Th(E5).
The result, flat(Th(E5)), is shown in Figure 6.4(b). As a consequence of re-
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(a)
q0 q1
q2 q3
q4 q5
q6 q7
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ε
ε
ε
ε
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a
ε
(b)
q0 q5
q6 q7
ε, ε
ε, ε
a
ε
ε, ε
(c)
q0 q5
q6 q7
qf
ε, ε
ε, ε
ε
ε
a
ε
ε
ε, ε
ε
.
Figure 6.4: The NFAs (a) Th(E) with E = (ε | a)∗, (b) flat(Th(E)) and (c) M ′A
with A = Th(E).
moving the ε-loops, the number of paths to read ak is reduced to at most 4.
Therefore, the NFA has constant degree of ambiguity, similar to E5, which has
constant degree of strong ambiguity.
If ε-loops are removed from NFAs, it is possible to relate the worst-case
matching time of backtracking matchers (discussed in Chapter 4) witnessed
when matching with E, and the degree of ambiguity of an NFA constructed
from E. We illustrate this using Thompson construction. To achieve this,
the constructed automaton is slightly adapted. For a regex E and an NFA
A = Th(E), let MA = flat(A). From MA, we construct M ′A, such that
the degree of ambiguity of M ′A determines an upper bound (often tight) for
matching time. If MA = (Q,Σ, q0, δ, F ), we construct M ′A such that M ′A =
(Q ∪ {qf},Σ, q0, δ′, {qf}), with the transition function δ′ defined as:
δ′(p, α, q) =

δ(p, α, q) p, q ∈ Q,α ∈ Σε;
1 p ∈ Q, q = qf, α = ε;
1 p = q = qf, α 6= ε;
0 otherwise.
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Informally, to construct M ′A, we add a new accept state qf to MA (and
change all original accept states to be nonaccept states). We then add ε-
transitions from all states in MA to qf to MA and a self-loop on qf for all
symbols. The degree of ambiguity of M ′A provides an upper bound for the
worst-case matching time of E. To understand why it is necessary to adapt
A into M ′A, recall that the backtracking matcher might attempt to match a
prefix of an input string in an exponential number of ways, even though the
match will ultimately fail. If we can force the matcher to try all possible paths
to match (prefixes of) an input string, this upper bound is tight. The tight
upper bound is usually achieved when it is possible to force the matcher to
reject an input string, after all these paths have been attempted.
We give an example of the process of obtaining an upper bound for the
matching time, with the regex E5 = (ε | a)∗. The NFAs Th(E5), flat(Th(E5))
and M ′A5 , for A5 = Th(E5), are shown in Figure 6.4. Observe that the NFA in
Figure 6.4(c) has IDA of degree 1. The ambiguity of this NFA provides a tight
upper bound to matching with E5, since E5 has linear worst-case matching
time.
As an example of estimating an upper bound when worst-case matching
time is exponential, consider the regex E6 = (a∗)∗. This regex has exponential
degree of strong ambiguity. To show this, we first annotate E6 as YsA(E6) =
1(2(3a)∗)∗. The regex YsA(E6) matches 123as1s2 . . . sn (in addition to some
other strings), where si ∈ {3a, 23a}, for i ≥ 1. Since there is an exponential,
in n, number of strings of the form w = 123as1s2 . . . sn, and since for all of
them piΣ(w) = an+1, we conclude that E6 has exponential degree of strong
ambiguity. We show A6 = Th(E6), flat(Th(E6)) and M ′A6 in Figure 6.5. From
these figures, it is clear that M ′A6 has EDA and therefore, we can estimate an
upper bound of exponential matching time for E6, which is tight.
6.6 Java Construction
In Chapter 4, we stated that a backtracking matcher will prioritise matches
made with certain subexpressions, over others, as well as that a backtracking
matcher will cease the matching process as soon as a successful match has
been found (or all possible paths have been exhausted). Clearly, this is an
indication that priorities can have an effect on matching time. As an example,
consider the regex E7 = (.∗ |(a∗)∗). As we have seen in Section 6.5, the
subexpression E7(4) = (a∗)∗ has exponential degree of strong ambiguity, and
thus, E7 has at least exponential degree of strong ambiguity. At the same
time, the backtracking matcher prioritises matches made with subexpression
E7(2) = .∗, over those made with E7(4). Consequently, as E7(2) will accept
any input string and the matcher will stop the matching processes as soon as
a string has been accepted, the matcher will accept any string in linear time.
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Figure 6.5: The NFAs (a) Th(E) where E = (a∗)∗, (b) flat(Th(E)) and (c) M ′A
where A = Th(E).
To obtain a precise bound on worst-case matching time, we need to incorpo-
rate the priorities of how a regex matches an input string, into our backtracking
matcher model. This can be achieved by including priorities in the regex to
automaton construction, so that it creates pNFAs, instead of standard NFAs.
We provide an adapted Thompson construction, which creates pNFAs with
priorities placed on the ε-transitions in such a way to model the priorities of a
backtracking matcher [23]. We refer to this adapted Thompson construction
as the prioritised Thompson construction, and denote the pNFA obtained from
applying this procedure to a regex E, as Thp(E). The construction of Thp(E),
when using concatenation, alternation, Kleene star and the lazy Kleene star
operator, is shown in Figure 6.6. Even though prioritised Thompson con-
struction is a step in the right direction, unfortunately, it cannot be used to
model arbitrary backtracking matchers. Due to the ad hoc implementation of
most backtracking matchers, the actual matching time and the (asymptotic)
matching time estimated by the model, could differ. Before we illustrate this
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Figure 6.6: Thompson pNFAs for (a) Thp(E1), (b) Thp(E1 · E2), (c) Thp(E1 | E2),
(d) Thp(E∗1) and (e) Th
p(E∗?1 ).
with an example, we first define the Java construction from [23], which models
the matching time of the Java matcher more accurately than the prioritised
Thompson construction.
The Java construction for a regex E, denoted by Jp(E) for a regex E, is
shown in Figure 6.7 for concatenation, alternation, Kleene star and the lazy
Kleene star operator. Using the Java construction, we can begin to understand
the long worst-case matching time of some regexes, when using the Java regex
matcher. In Figure 6.8, the pNFAs Jp(E2) and flat(Jp(E2)) are shown (recall
that E2 = (a | a)∗) respectively. If we let A2 = nfa(Jp(E2)) and we construct
M ′A2 , it can be seen that M
′
A2
has EDA, as Shown in Figure 6.8(c). This
suggests that E2 has an exponential matching time upper bound. It can be
confirmed that this upper bound is tight by observing that there are two loops
for reading the input string a from state q0. As a result of these two loops,
while matching the input string anb, every a symbol can be matched in two
ways. This means n a symbols can be matched in an exponential, in n, number
of ways. The b symbol at the end of the input string will force the matcher to
reject every attempt at matching the input string, and consequently force the
matcher to try the exponentially many ways of matching the a symbols.
Next we show why the Java construction provides a more accurate upper
bound for the matching time than prioritised Thompson construction. The
construction used to convert a regex to pNFA is important, since it determines
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Figure 6.7: The resulting pNFAs of (a) Jp(E1), (b) Jp(E1 ·E2), (c) Jp(E1 | E2), (d)
Jp(E∗1) and (e) Jp(E∗?1 ).
in part on which input strings some regexes exhibit the nonlinear polynomial or
exponential matching time, as shown in [23]. Specifically, when constructing a
regex, using one construction might result in some input string being capable of
triggering the nonlinear polynomial or exponential matching time behaviour,
and another construction might result in an entirely different input string being
able to do the same.
In more extreme cases, different constructions may even influence whether
a regex is vulnerable to nonlinear polynomial or exponential matching time
or not. Consider the regex E8 = ((ε | .∗)∗(a | a)∗). The pNFAs Thp(E8) and
Jp(E8) are given in Figures 6.9 and 6.10, respectively. To understand the
difference in vulnerability between these two constructions, compare how each
goes about matching the input string anb. When matching with prioritised
Thompson construction, the following path will be taken, q0
ε1−→ q1 ε1−→ q2 ε1−→
q3
ε1−→ q8 ε1−→ q1 ε2−→ q4 ε1−→ q5 .−→ q6 ε1−→ q5, and the matcher will continue
taking the wildcard loop until the entire input string has been consumed. The
matcher will then simply continue to the accept state and accept the input
string, backtracking only at states q5, q12 and q14. Since the entire input string
was consumed on the wildcard loop, the matching time will be linear in the
length of the input string when modeling it using the prioritised Thompson
construction. When using the Java construction, the following path is taken,
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Figure 6.8: The pNFAs (a) Jp(E2), (b) flat(Jp(E2)) where E2 = (a | a)∗ and (c)
M ′A where A = nfa(J
p(E2)).
q0
ε1−→ q1 ε1−→ q5 ε1−→ q2 ε1−→ q1 ε1−→ q6 ε1−→ q9, and the matcher will attempt to match
anb with the (a | a)∗ subexpression, in exponential time. The difference in
vulnerability between the two constructions is due to the fact that in the Java
construction, both branches of the alternation in (ε | .∗)∗, share an ε-transition,
so after the ε-loop has completed, the matcher cannot take the second branch
and must continue to match with the next subexpression. The priorities and
matching time modeled by the pNFA obtained by the Java construction aligns
more accurately with what is observed when measuring the matching time
experimentally.
Since the construction used for a regex can affect the vulnerability thereof,
we can only accurately state that a regex is vulnerable for a specific construc-
tion. Due to this limitation, we will restrict our focus to modeling the matching
time of the Java regex matcher.
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Figure 6.9: The pNFA Thp(((ε |.∗)∗(a | a)∗)).
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Figure 6.10: The pNFA Jp(((ε |.∗)∗(a | a)∗)).
6.7 Constructing Regexes with Various
Asymptotic Matching Times
Now that we have a method of constructing pNFAs capable of modeling the
matching behaviour of Java, we construct regexes with various polynomial and
exponential growth in matching time.
First, consider the pNFA A3 = Jp(E3), where E3 = a∗a∗, as shown in
Figure 6.11. From the figure it can be seen that there are two loops reading
the symbol a, namely q1
ε1−→ q2 a−→ q1 and q3 ε1−→ q4 a−→ q3. Furthermore, the
matcher can traverse the pNFA from one loop to the other without reading
any input. From the results of Section 2.7.1, specifically Figure 2.3, we have
thatM ′A3 has IDA of degree 2 (and hence we have an upper bound of quadratic
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q0 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
ε1 ε1
ε2
a
ε1
ε2
a
Figure 6.11: The pNFA Jp(a∗a∗).
q0 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8
ε1 ε1 ε1
ε2
a
ε1
ε2
a
ε1
ε2
a
Figure 6.12: The pNFA Jp(a∗a∗a∗).
matching time). Next we consider how the matcher can match the input string
an. From both the pNFA and regex, it can be seen that the matcher can divide
the a symbols in a linear number of ways between the two a∗ subexpressions.
We can therefore conclude that the degree of ambiguity is of order O(n),
where n is the length of the input string. Finally, when the matcher is forced
to backtrack every path it explores, by giving it a string of the form anb, the
matching time is quadratic.
We can increase the degree of the IDA, by adding another a∗ to the regex,
as in Figure 6.12. In this case there is a quadratic number of ways in which
to divide an between the three a∗ subexpressions in E9 = a∗a∗a∗. Thus the
degree of ambiguity is O(n2) and matching time O(n3).
It should be clear that it is possible to construct a pNFA for which the
matching time is bounded by a polynomial with arbitrary degree, by concate-
nating the subexpression a∗ multiple times. That is, the regex a∗ . . . a∗, with d
repetitions of a∗, will have IDA of degree d−1, that is the degree of ambiguity
grows in O(nd−1), and hence the matching time in O(nd) .
Extending from the previous idea, we construct a regex for which the pNFA
will have exponential worst-case matching time. We need an unbounded num-
ber of a∗ in which the matcher can divide the a’s in the input string. This
is achieved by the regex (a∗)∗, which has both exponential ambiguity and
worst-case matching time.
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6.8 Conclusion
This chapter explored the relationship between regexes, NFAs and ambiguity.
We also discussed the significance of the regex to pNFA construction used
for modeling purposes. We showed regexes with worst-case matching time in
O(nd), for d ≥ 1, and with exponential worst-case matching time.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 7
Explaining Regex Vulnerabilities
by Example
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6, the theory behind vulnerable regexes began to emerge. It was
explained at a high level why certain regexes have a bad (i.e., nonlinear) worst-
case matching time in Java. In this chapter, the intricacies of regex vulner-
abilities are discussed in greater detail, drawing on the concepts explained in
Chapters 4 and 6.
In Chapter 6, weak and strong ambiguity of regexes were defined. In this
chapter (and whenever the vulnerability of a regex is the main focus) we are
less concerned whether a regex E is weakly or strongly ambiguous, and more
interested in the maximum rate of growth of the degree of ambiguity. There-
fore, for the remainder of this thesis, if we state that a regex is infinitely
ambiguous (or exponentially ambiguous), it can be assumed sAE(n) is a non-
constant polynomial (or exponential) function. Moreover, for a word w, if wn
is a word that can be matched in a nonconstant polynomial (or exponential)
number of ways by E(i), we say E(i) is infinitely (or exponentially) ambiguous
on wn.
7.2 Vulnerable Regexes
As explained in Chapter 4, when a backtracking matcher fails to match an
input string when using higher priority ε-transitions, it backtracks to take the
lower priority ε-transitions. When matching an input string with a regex, it is
obviously preferred and often assumed that the matching time will be linear
in the length of the input strings, however, forcing the matcher to attempt
a large number of lower priority transitions, could cause nonlinear matching
time. We will consider regexes with nonlinear worst-case matching time and
vulnerable regexes to be equivalent. The most straightforward case of regex
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vulnerability occurs in regexes with infinite or exponential degree of ambiguity.
We discuss this case in Section 7.3. In spite of this, not all regexes with infinite
or exponential degree of ambiguity are vulnerable, as shown in Section 7.4.
We will make a single deviation from our theoretical definition of vulnerable
regexes in Section 7.5. We do this to investigate regexes with linear matching
time in the worst-case, but which should be considered vulnerable in a practical
setting.
From Chapter 6, we have that the degree of ambiguity of M ′A, where A =
nfa(flat(Jp(E))), provides an upper bound for matching time. The fundamental
goal of this chapter is to investigate under which conditions this upper bound
is tight.
7.3 Vulnerable Regexes with Infinite or
Exponential Degree of Ambiguity
When a regex E has infinite or exponential degree of ambiguity, there exists a
subexpression E(i) for i as large as possible such that E(i) has the same degree
of ambiguity as E. Let wn1 be a string that can be matched by such an E(i) in a
nonconstant polynomial or exponential number of ways. If wn1 is incorporated
as a substring in an input string w0wn1w2, such that after matching w0, the
matcher is at the initial state corresponding to E(i), and w2 is selected such
that w0wn1w2 6∈ L(E), then the matcher is forced the to try each of the many
ways of matching wn1 with E(i), causing a nonlinear matching time.
Next we provide two examples illustrating these ideas.
The pNFA Jp(E), when E = a∗a∗, has infinite ambiguity of degree 1, as
shown in Chapter 6. Also, flat(Jp(E)) is shown in Figure 7.1. Using flat(Jp(E)),
we construct the backtracking trees obtained during matching. The number of
states in these backtracking trees models the duration of the matching time.
Also, the growth in size of these backtracking trees, in relation to the length
of the input string, models the rate of growth of the matching time. The
backtracking trees obtained when matching a, ab, aa and aab are shown in
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 respectively. The increase in number of states visited when
matching ab or aab, is caused by E being infinitely ambiguous on an, and the
suffix b forcing the matcher to try numerous ways of matching the prefixes.
The number of states in backtracking trees, and therefore the matching time,
on input anb, and the worst-case matching in general, grows quadratically.
The regex E = (a | a)∗ has exponential degree of ambiguity, as shown in
Chapter 6. The pNFAs Jp(E) and flat(Jp(E)), are given in Figure 6.8, and
the backtracking trees for matching a, ab and aab in Figures 7.4 and 7.5.
Matching time when using anb as input, and in the worst-case in general,
grows exponentially.
Unfortunately, infinite or exponential degree of ambiguity in regexes is not
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q0 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
ε1
ε2
ε3
ε1
ε2
ε3
a
ε1
ε2
a
Figure 7.1: The pNFA flat(Jp(a∗a∗)).
(a)
q0
q2
q1
q2

q4

q5

(b)
q0
q2 q4 q5

q1 q3
q2

q4

q5

q4

q5

Figure 7.2: The backtracking trees produced when matching (a) a and (b) ab with
the pNFA flat(Jp(a∗a∗)).
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(a)
q0
q2
q1
q2
q1
q2

q4

q5

(b)
q0
q2 q4 q5

q1 q3
q2 q4 q5

q4 q5

q1 q3 q3
q2

q4

q5

q4

q5

q4

q5

Figure 7.3: The backtracking trees produced when matching (a) aa and (b) aab
with the pNFA flat(Jp(a∗a∗)).
sufficient for regex vulnerability. This was alluded to in Chapter 6, when it
was shown that some regexes with exponential degree of ambiguity can match
all strings in linear time.
7.4 Harmless Regexes with Infinite or
Exponential Degree of Ambiguity
As mentioned before, a regex with infinite or exponential degree of ambi-
guity might not be vulnerable, due to how matching with some subexpres-
sions is prioritised over matching with others. Consider for example a regex
E = (E1 |E2 | . . . |En |EV), where EV being vulnerable, while each Ei has linear
matching time, and assume L(E1 | . . . |En) = Σ∗. Because of the prioritisation
of matching with subexpressions, E will match every input string in linear time,
and is consequently not vulnerable. A specific example of this nature was intro-
duced in Chapter 6, where E = (.∗ |(a∗)∗). The pNFAs Jp(E) and flat(Jp(E)),
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(a)
q0
q2
q0
q2

q3

q4

(b)
q0
q2 q3 q4

q0 q0
q2

q3

q4

q2

q3

q4

Figure 7.4: The backtracking trees produced when matching (a) a and (b) ab with
the pNFA flat(Jp((a | a)∗)).
shown in Figure 7.7, model the behaviour of the Java regex matcher. Inspect-
ing these pNFAs shows that a higher priority is given to matching with the
subexpression E(2) = .∗ than with E(4) = (a∗)∗. Consequently, since E(2)
accepts all strings in linear time, the matching time will be linear for any input
string. Also, the backtracking trees produced when matching the input strings
ab, aab and anb with flat(Jp(E)), are shown in Figure 7.6. The number of
states in the backtracking trees grows linearly with respect to the length of
the input strings, which confirms linear matching time.
The harmlessness of certain regexes with infinite or exponential degree of
ambiguity does not necessarily rely on the highly ambiguous subexpressions
being unreachable. A regex E = E0E1, in which E0 has infinite or exponential
degree of ambiguity, is not necessarily vulnerable, for example in the regex
E = (a | a)∗.∗, the subexpression (a | a)∗ with exponential degree of ambiguity
is reachable, but it is impossible to force the matcher to backtrack to try the
exponentially many ways of matching an input string an. For a more involved
example, consider the regex E = a{l}.∗ |(a | a)∗ , for a constant integer l.
The subexpression with exponential degree of ambiguity, (a | a)∗, is indeed
reachable, however, only on input strings of the form anw, where n < l and
w is selected such that anw 6∈ L(a{l}.∗). Consequently, for l small enough,
this regex is not vulnerable, since the matching time cannot grow large enough
(in spite of its exponential growth) before the subexpression with exponential
degree of ambiguity becomes unreachable and matching completes in linear
time.
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q0
q2 q3 q4

q0 q0
q2 q3 q4

q2 q3 q4

q0 q0 q0 q0
q2

q3

q4

q2

q3

q4

q2

q3

q4

q2

q3

q4

Figure 7.5: The backtracking tree produced when matching aab with the pNFA
flat(Jp((a | a)∗)).
7.5 Vulnerable Regexes with Constant Degree
of Ambiguity
It might be tempting to declare all regexes with constant degree of ambiguity
as harmless, but this may not necessarily be the case. As a counterexample,
consider the regex E = E1E2, where the subexpression E1 has exponential
degree of ambiguity, with the string wn being exponentially ambiguous and
L(E2) = ∅. The regex E is not ambiguous, indeed L(E) = ∅. In spite
of this, the regex is vulnerable. If we assume the regex matcher does not
simplify E to ∅, matching the regex with the input string wn will exhibit
exponential matching time. This occurs due to the matcher still attempting
the exponentially many ways of matching wn with E1, while rejecting each
way due to the subexpression E2.
There also exist regexes with constant degree of ambiguity, but for which
this constant is so large, that the matching time can become extremely long,
albeit linear in the length of the input string. In contrast to our theoretical
definition of vulnerable regexes, of Section 7.2, it is reasonable to consider
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(a)
q0
q2
q1
q2
q1
q2

q3

(b)
q0
q2
q1
q2
q1
q2
q1
q2

q3

(c)
q0
q2
q1
q2
...
q2
q1
q2

q3

Figure 7.6: The backtracking trees produced when matching (a) ab, (b) aab and
(c) anb with the pNFA flat(Jp(E)), where E = .∗ |(a | a)∗.
(a)
q0
q1 q2
q3
q4 q5
q6
q7
ε1
ε2
ε1
ε2
.
ε1
ε2
ε1
ε2
a
a
(b)
q0
q1q2
q3
q4
q6
q7
ε1
ε2, ε5
ε3
ε4
ε1
ε2
.
ε1
ε2
ε3
a
a
Figure 7.7: The pNFAs (a) Jp(E) and (b) flat(Jp(E)) for E = .∗ |(a | a)∗.
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q0,0
q0,1
q0,2
q1,0
q1,1
q1,2
· · ·
ql−1,1
ql−1,2
ql,0
ε1
ε2
a
a
ε1
ε2
a
a
ε1
ε2
a
a
Figure 7.8: The pNFA flat(Jp((a | a){l})).
(a)
q0,0
q0,1 q0,2
q1,0 q2,0
q1,1

q1,2

q1,1

q1,2

(b)
q0,0
q0,1 q0,2
q1,0 q1,0
q1,1 q1,2 q1,1 q1,2
q2,0 q2,0 q2,0 q2,0
q2,1

q2,2

q2,1

q2,2

q2,1

q2,2

q2,1

q2,2

Figure 7.9: The backtracking trees produced when matching (a) ab and (b) aab
with the pNFA flat(Jp((a | a){l})).
these regexes as vulnerable, at least in a practical sense. Consider for example
a regex such as E = (a | a){l}. This regex has constant degree of ambiguity,
which can be verified quickly, by noting the regex does not match input strings
longer than l. In spite of this, when matching input strings of the form anb,
for n < l, the matching time will grow exponentially in n up to n = l. If l is
sufficiently large, the matching time will become large enough for the regex to
be considered vulnerable. The pNFA flat(Jp(E)), is given in Figure 7.8, and
backtracking trees when matching ab and aab in Figure 7.9. For this expo-
nential growth to occur, the b suffix is unnecessary, and exponential matching
time also occurs for input string an, where n < l.
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7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we explored, via examples, the relationship between infinite
and exponential degree of ambiguity of regexes and the property of a regex
being vulnerable.
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Chapter 8
Deciding Worst-case Matching
Time
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate how the results from Chapters 2, 4 and 6 can be
used to determine the worst-case matching time of regexes. This will ultimately
allow us to decide if a regex is vulnerable, or not. We provide two analyses, a
polynomial algorithm allowing us to calculate an upper bound for the worst-
case matching time of a regex, and an exponential algorithm for determining
a tight bound.
8.2 Matching Time Analysis
In this section we will describe two different methods for analysing the match-
ing time of a regex. As stated in Chapter 6, we focus mainly on the matching
time behaviour of the Java regex matcher. Nonetheless, the results returned
by simple analysis are relevant for other backtracking matchers as well, as
explained in Section 8.2.1. Since we are mainly interested in the Java regex
matcher, the analyses will operate over pNFAs constructed with the Java con-
struction, introduced in Chapter 6. Therefore, when analysing regex E, our
analysis starts by constructing the pNFA Jp(E).
As explained in Section 4.4.1, when modeling backtracking matching, we
need to prevent the reuse of ε-transitions between reading input symbols. In
our analyses this is achieved by converting the pNFA Jp(E) to the flattened
pNFA flat(Jp(E)).
8.2.1 Simple Analysis
Simple analysis provides an upper bound for the matching time of a regex by
calculating the degree of ambiguity of an NFA obtained from the regex under
66
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consideration. Simple analysis relies on the result obtained in Chapter 6,
showing that the degree of ambiguity of an NFA (obtained from a regex E),
can be related to worst-case matching time with the regex E. Since simple
analysis only calculates the degree of ambiguity, the upper bound returned
thereby is valid, although not necessarily tight, for any backtracking matcher
that uses a regex to automaton construction that preserves the degree of regex
ambiguity.
To analyse the regex E, the NFA A = nfa(flat(Jp(E))) is constructed.
From A, M ′A is constructed (as defined in Chapter 6), since the degree of am-
biguity of M ′A serves as an upper bound for the matching time of E. The
degree of ambiguity of M ′A can be calculated by, for example, using the algo-
rithms provided in [13; 14], which will allow simple analysis to be performed
in polynomial time, as shown in Theorem 8.1. Recall that |A|δ denotes the
number of transitions in A.
Theorem 8.1 ([14]). Let A be an ε-loop free NFA, for which all states are
reachable. Then
- It is decidable in time O(|A|3δ) whether A is infinitely ambiguous, and in
time O(|A|2δ) whether A is exponentially ambiguous.
- If A is infinitely ambiguous, the degree of infinite ambiguity of A can be
computed in O(|A|3δ).
What follows is a high-level description of algorithms that can be used
to detect IDA and EDA in an NFA. For a more in-depth discussion, con-
sult [14]. For detecting IDA in an NFA, the product A3 = A×F ×A×F ×A
is calculated, where F is a transducer used to eliminate some ε-transitions
that cause false positive cases of IDA and EDA. In the NFA A3, the states
form 3-tuples (p0, p1, p2), where pi ∈ Q, and the transition function is a
function δ : Q3 × Σε × Q3 → N, defined as δ((p0, p1, p2), α, (p′0, p′1, p′2)) =∏2
i=0(δ(pi, α, p
′
i)) if δ(pi, α, p′i) is defined for each i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and other-
wise δ((p0, p1, p2), α, (p′0, p′1, p′2)) is undefined. The NFA A3 is then explored
to search for a path from a state (p, p, q) to (p, q, q) where p 6= q. Such a path
in A3 indicates the existence of a path from state p to p, as well as a path from
state p to q and a path from q to q, all on the same input string. From the
results in Chapter 2, we know this is an indication of IDA of degree (at least) 1.
The highest degree of IDA in A can be determined by finding the longest path,
linking pairs of states (pi, pi, qi) and (pi, qi, qi) in A3, by using nonempty strings.
For example, a path (p0, p0, q0)
w0−→ (p0, q0, q0) w1−→ (p1, p1, q1) w2−→ (p1, q1, q1) in-
dicates IDA of degree (at least) 2, if w0, w2 6= ε. As an example, consider
the regex E = a∗a∗bc∗c∗. The NFA A = nfa(flat(Jp(E))) is shown in Fig-
ure 8.1(a). Comparing A to Figure 2.5 should make it clear that M ′A has
IDA of degree 3. We provide some of the states and transitions of the NFA
(M ′A)
3 in Figure 8.1(b). From the figure we see that there exists a path from
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(a)
q0 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9 q10
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
a
ε
ε
a
b ε
ε
ε
c
ε
ε
c
(b)
(q0, q0, q0) (q2, q2, q4) (q1, q1, q3) (q2, q4, q4) (q1, q3, q3) (q5, q5, q5)
(q6, q6, q6)(q7, q7, q9)(q6, q6, q8)(q7, q9, q9)(q6, q8, q8)
(q9, q9, qf) (q8, q8, qf) (q9, qf, qf) (q8, qf, qf) (qf, qf, qf)
ε a ε a ε
ε
b
εcεc
ε
ε
c ε c ε
ε
Figure 8.1: (a) The NFA A = nfa(flat(Jp(E))) with E = a∗a∗bc∗c∗ and (b) some
of the states and transitions of (M ′A)
3.
state (q2, q2, q4) to (q2, q4, q4) on a, from (q7, q7, q9) to (q7, q9, q9) on c, and from
(q9, q9, qf) to (q9, qf, qf) on c. Furthermore, these paths can all be incorporated
into a single larger path. Therefore, M ′A has IDA of degree 3. Simple analysis
thus provides an upper bound of cubic matching time for E, which is tight in
this case.
Similarly, for detecting exponential degree of ambiguity in an NFA, A2 =
A× F × A is calculated. In the NFA A2, the states are tuples (p0, p1) where
pi ∈ Q and the transition function is a function δ : Q2×Σε×Q2 → N, defined
as δ((p0, p1), α, (p′0, p′1)) =
∏1
i=0(δ(pi, α, p
′
i)) if δ(pi, α, p′i) is defined for each i,
otherwise δ((p0, p1), α, (p′0, p′1)) is undefined. Within each strongly connected
component (a subset of states that are all mutually reachable) of A2 we search
for a path containing at least one symbol transition between states of the form
(p, p) and (q, q′), such that q 6= q′. The presence of this path indicates two
distinct loops from p to itself in A, while reading the same nonempty input
string. From the results in Chapter 2, we know this is an indication of EDA.
To illustrate the detection of EDA in an NFA, we give A = nfa(flat(Jp(E))),
for E = .∗ |(a | a)∗ in Figure 8.2. Noting the two loops from state q4 to itself
while reading the input symbol a should be enough to convince us that A has
EDA, but we also provide some of the states and transitions of the NFA (M ′A)2
in Figure 8.2(b). It can be seen that in (M ′A)2 there is a strongly connected
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(a)
q0
q1q2
q3
q4
q6
q7
ε
ε, ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
.
ε
ε
ε
a
a
(b)
(q0, q0) (q6, q7) (q4, q4) (qf, qf)
ε a
ε
ε
Figure 8.2: (a) The NFA A = nfa(flat(Jp(E))) with E = .∗ |(a | a)∗ and (b) some
of the states and transitions of (M ′A)
2.
component containing the states (q6, q7) and (q4, q4). In this strongly connected
component, the state (q4, q4) can be reached from (q6, q7) by reading the input
string a. This indicates two loops in M ′A, from state q4 to itself, while reading
a and therefore our algorithm for detecting exponential degree of ambiguity
will determine M ′A indeed has EDA. Simple analysis will therefore provide
an upper bound of exponential matching time for E. In contrast to this, in
Chapter 7 we have seen that E has linear matching time.
8.2.2 Full Analysis
When priorities of ε-transitions are ignored, information is lost, and conse-
quently, converting the pNFA flat(Jp(E)) to the NFA nfa(flat(Jp(E))), causes
the imprecise results of simple analysis. As illustrated in Chapter 4, a back-
tracking matcher prioritises certain subexpressions over others and it was
shown in Chapter 7 that these priorities may alter matching time, by rendering
some subexpressions unreachable. This usually happens due to the matcher
always finding a match with some higher priority subexpression. In this sec-
tion we describe an analysis technique that yields precise results, by removing
these unreachable states. We refer to this analysis as the full analysis.
In order to obtain a precise result from the analysis, we need to incorporate
the priorities of the ε-transitions therein. To do this, we define the concept
of an unprioritised pNFA (upNFA). From a pNFA A we obtain the upNFA,
denoted by up(A), by keeping track in each state of up(A) the states of A the
matcher could have been in by following a path with higher priority for the
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same input string. This is done by performing a type of subset construction of
all the states reachable via a higher priority path. To simplify the construction
of up(A), we assume A has no ε-loops. If this is not the case, we convert A to
flat(A) and construct up(flat(A)) instead. The formal definition of a upNFA
is given in Definition 8.1. An example of converting Jp(E) to flat(Jp(E)) and
then to up(flat(Jp(E))), is given in Figure 8.3, for E = .∗ |(a | a)∗.
For the pNFA A = (Q1, Q2,Σ, q0, δ1, δ2, F ), the states in a upNFA up(A)
are tuples (p, P ), where p ∈ Q1∪Q2 and P ⊆ Q1. We then remove from up(A)
the states with a P such that every w ∈ Σ∗ can be accepted by traversing a
path in A starting at some p′ ∈ P . Let us refer to up(A) with these unreachable
states removed, as A′. After the unreachable states have been removed from
up(A), the matching time is determined, by constructing M ′A′ and using it
to determine an upper bound for the matching time, in the same way as for
simple analysis.
In order to remove the unreachable states we are effectively required to
decide if an automaton accepts the entire language Σ∗. To decide this is to
solve the NFA-universality problem, which is PSPACE-complete, as shown
in [33]. Consequently, full analysis is much more computationally expensive
than simple analysis.
To understand the difference the upNFA makes, compare the upNFA A1 =
up(Jp(E1)) in Figure 8.3, for the harmless regex E1 = .∗ |(a∗)∗, to the upNFA
A2 = up(Jp(E2)) in Figure 8.4, for the vulnerable regex E2 = (a∗)∗ | .∗. Assume
all the dashed states, which indicate the unreachable states, have already been
removed from both A1 and A2. The result is, in A1, almost all that remains
is a wildcard loop and therefore M ′A1 will have infinite ambiguity of degree 1.
With this information, a tight upper bound of linear matching time can be
assigned to E1. Conversely, in M ′A2 there will still be multiple paths from
state (q5, {q3, q6}) to itself while reading the input string a, indicating EDA
and since these states are indeed reachable, the regex is assigned a tight upper
bound of exponential matching time and is therefore vulnerable.
Definition 8.1. Let A := (Q1, Q2,Σ, q0, δ1, δ2, F ), then up(A) is the NFA
given by (Q′,Σ, q′0, δ′, F ′), where:
(i) Q′ = ((Q1 ∪Q2)×P(Q1)) \Q′′, where Q′′ is the set of states (p, P ) such
that for all w ∈ Σ∗, there is a p′ ∈ P , such that w has an accepting path
in nfa(A) starting at p′;
(ii) q′0 = {(q0, ∅)} and F ′ = (F × P(Q1)) ∩Q′;
(iii) for a ∈ Σ, δ′((p, P ), a, (p′, P ′)) = 1 if δ1(p, a) = p′ and δ1(P, a)∩Q1 = P ′,
where δ1 is extended to be defined on sets of states in the obvious way;
(iv) δ′((p, P ), ε, (pi, P ∪ {p1, . . . , pi−1} ∩ Q1)) = ij, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if p ∈ Q2
and δ2(p) = p1 . . . pn, where ij is the number of indices i′ where pi = pi′
and P ∪ {p1, . . . , pi−1} ∩Q1 = P ∪ {p1, . . . , pi′−1} ∩Q1.
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(b)
q0
q1q2
q3
q5q6
ε1
ε2, ε4, ε5
ε3
ε1
ε2
.
ε1, ε2 ε3
a
(c)
(q0, ∅) (q2, ∅) (q1, ∅)
(q3, {q2})
(q6, {q2, q3}) (q5, {q2, q3}) (q6, {q2, q3, q6})
(q5, {q2, q3, q6})(q3, {q2, q3, q6})
ε
ε
ε
ε ε
.
ε
ε
a
ε
ε
ε a ε ε
ε
Figure 8.3: The pNFAs (a) Jp(E), (b) flat(Jp(E)) and (c) the unprioritised pNFA
for flat(Jp(E)) for E = .∗ |(a∗)∗. Dashed states indicate the unreachable states
(states Q′′ in Definition 8.1) that should be removed.
8.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we brought together results from previous chapters in order
to develop static analysis techniques for regexes. We described simple and
full analysis, i.e., two ways of estimating worst-case matching time for a given
regex. These methods provide an upper and precise bound respectively. By
using our static analysis techniques, developers can determine whether the
regexes used in their software is safe to use or not.
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Figure 8.4: The pNFAs (a) Jp(E), (b) flat(Jp(E)) and (c) the unprioritised pNFA
for flat(Jp(E)) for E = (a∗)∗ |.∗ we show. Dashed states indicate the unreachable
states (states Q′′ in Definition 8.1) that should be removed. Recall the notation [^a]
means any symbol but a
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Chapter 9
Triggering Worst-Case Matching
Time
9.1 Introduction
Along with knowing whether or not a regex is vulnerable, it is also valu-
able to know for which input strings the nonlinear polynomial, or exponential
matching time is triggered. Such strings can ultimately be used to prove the
vulnerability of a regex.
9.2 Exploit Strings
We refer to strings that trigger the worst-case matching time of a vulnerable
regex as exploit strings. Exploit strings usually achieve their goal by forcing
the matcher to try the numerous ways of matching with some ambiguous
subexpression E(i) of a regex E.
9.3 Building Exploit Strings
To explain how exploit strings are constructed for vulnerable regexes, we use
the example regex E0E1E2, which we assume is vulnerable. Let s0 ∈ L(E0),
r 6∈ L(E1E2), and assume E1 is exponentially ambiguous on wn1 for n > 0.
Exploit strings are made up of four types of parts, namely the prefix, the
pumps, the pump separators and the suffix. An exploit string is typically of the
form s0wn00 s1w
n1
1 s2 . . . w
nk
k r, where n0, n1, . . . , nk ∈ N, where s0 is the prefix, wi
and sj where i, j ∈ N, j > 0, are the pumps and pump separators, respectively,
and lastly, r is the suffix. These parts are explained in the following sections.
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9.3.1 Prefix
The prefix of an exploit string is the substring that allows the matcher to reach
an infinitely, or exponentially ambiguous subexpression. In our example regex
E0E1E2, we need to force the matcher to reach the ambiguous subexpression
E1. This can be achieved by using s0 ∈ L(E0) as a prefix of the exploit string.
9.3.2 Pumps
The main goal of a pump is to create a large number of backtracking possibil-
ities for a matcher. For our example vulnerable regex we use the string w1 as
a pump, since it is assumed that E1 is exponentially ambiguous on wn1 .
Note that in some cases it is required to have multiple pumps. For example,
consider a regex of the form E0∗E1∗R0∗R1∗, where w0 ∈ L(E0) ∩ L(E1) and
w1 ∈ L(R0)∩L(R1) and L(E0)∩L(E1)∩L(R0)∩L(R1) = ∅, i.e., w0 6= w1. This
regex has infinite ambiguity of degree at least 2 and the worst-case matching
time is (at least) cubic in the length of the input string, if it is, for example,
the case that we can find a string r, such that all strings having r as suffix are
not in L(E0∗E1∗R0∗R1∗). Thus in this case strings of the form wn00 wn11 r can
be used as exploit strings (and thus we can use the empty string as prefix and
pump separator).
9.3.3 Pump Separators
The regex E0∗E1∗R0∗R1∗ was used above to motivate the need (in some cases)
for more than one pump in an exploit string, but the subexpressions E0∗E1∗
and R0∗R1∗ do not have to appear in succession for the regex to have infinite
ambiguity of degree (at least) 2. For example, the regex E0∗E1∗RF0∗F1∗, where
L(E0) ∩ L(E1) 6= ∅, L(F0) ∩ L(F1) 6= ∅ and L(R) 6= ∅ will also have infinite
ambiguity of degree (at least) 2. For this regex, the pumps can be selected
from L(E0) ∩ L(E1) and L(F0) ∩ L(F1) respectively, and any string in L(R)
can be used as pump separator.
9.3.4 Suffixes
Exploit strings are constructed with a suffix which forces the matcher to back-
track and revisit all the backtracking possibilities created by the pumps. This
is usually achieved by appending some string that is rejected by subexpressions
in which the final pump was matched and also by all subsequent subexpres-
sions. For example, with E0E1E2, we can use r 6∈ L(E1E2) as suffix of the
exploit string.
Note that it is not required that exploit strings are rejected by the matcher.
Consider for example a regex of the form E0E1 |E2, where E0 is a subexpression
with exponential degree of ambiguity. Assume E0 is exponentially ambiguous
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q0 q1 q2 q3 q4
q5
q6
q7 q8
ε1 ε1 a ε1
ε2
ε1
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b
b
c
Figure 9.1: The pNFA Jp(E) where E = a(b | b)∗c.
on wn0 , wn0 r 6∈ L(E0E1) and wn0 r ∈ E2. Then exploit strings of the form wn0 r
will trigger exponential matching time, since matching with E0E1 is given
a higher priority than with E2. A specific example of this type is given by
E = (a | a)∗ | .∗, for which strings of the form anb can be used as exploit
strings.
Example 9.1. In this example we show how to build exploit strings for the
vulnerable regex E = a(b | b)∗c. The pNFA Jp(E) is given in Figure 9.1. From
Chapter 6 it should be clear that the subexpression (b | b)∗ has exponential
degree of ambiguity. In order to allow the matcher to reach (b | b)∗, we use a
as prefix in our exploit strings. The suffix needs to force the matcher to try
all the possible ways of matching the exploit strings, and thus the string d will
suffice. We thus use abnd as exploit strings.
Example 9.2. When considering the slightly more complicated vulnerable
regex E = ab∗b∗cd∗d∗e, the previous discussions in this chapter should make
it clear that abn0cdn1f can for example be used as exploit strings.
9.4 Attack Automata
The problem of constructing exploit strings for vulnerable regexes has been
investigated more thoroughly in [34]. In this paper it is described how an au-
tomaton can be constructed to recognise the language of all exploit strings for
a specific vulnerable regex. These automata are referred to as attack automata.
Using an approach similar to the one described in [34], we can construct
attack automata for vulnerable regexes. For E1(E2 |E3)∗E4 for example, we
can construct an attack automaton as follows. Automata Ap, Ac and As are
created such that L(Ap) = L(E1), L(Ac) = L(E2) ∩ L(E3) and L(As) =
L((E2 |E3)∗E4), where L(E) is used to denote the complement of the language
L(E). The resulting attack automata Aa is formed by using Ap, Ac and As,
such that L(Aa) = L(Ap) · (L(Ac))+ · L(As).
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p0 p1 p2 p3 p4
a b
b
c
a, d
a, b, c, d
a, b, c, d
Figure 9.2: An attack automaton for the vulnerable regex E = a(b | b)∗c for which
Jp(E) is shown in Figure 9.1.
An attack automaton for the regex used in Example 9.1, a(b | b)∗c, is given
in Figure 9.2. Note, this attack automaton is constructed over the alphabet
{a, b, c, d}, but it is trivial to extend it to an arbitrary alphabet.
9.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed the process of constructing strings capable of
triggering the worst-case matching time of vulnerable regexes. Examples were
given to show how these exploit strings can be used to confirm the vulnerability
of a given regex.
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Chapter 10
Experimental results
10.1 Introduction
We can test the effectiveness of the analyses developed in Chapter 8 by analysing
regexes used in practice. If an analysis labels a regex as vulnerable, it should
be possible to trigger exponential matching time in the Java matcher while
matching the regex with some input string. In this chapter, we present the
results obtained when experimentally analysing regexes with a Java implemen-
tation of the analyses. This Java implementation can be found in the software
repository at [35]. All experiments were performed on a machine with hard-
ware specifications as listed in Table 10.1.
10.2 Simple Analysis Results
The simple analysis was performed on two repositories of regexes, the Snort
rule-set version 2.9.31 [36] containing 12499 regexes and RegExLib [37], con-
taining 2994 regexes. As explained in Section 8.2.1, simple analysis provides
an upper bound for the worst-case matching time of a regex, by calculating the
degree of ambiguity of a related NFA. In practice, simple analysis was imple-
mented to test for an upper bound of exponential matching time first, achieved
by performing an algorithm to detect EDA. In the absence of an exponential
upper bound, it proceeds to test for an upper bound of nonlinear matching
time, by performing an algorithm that detects IDA. If such a nonlinear upper
bound is found, the degree of IDA is also calculated. Therefore, performing
Table 10.1: Hardware specifications of the machine on which the experiments were
performed.
Processor speed 3.1GHz
Number of cores 4
Cache size 6144Kb
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Table 10.2: A breakdown of the simple analysis results.
Repository Exp Nonlin Lin Skipped Timeout EDA Timeout IDA
Snort 11 829 8385 3110 96 68
RegExLib 141 219 1606 973 13 42
Table 10.3: The degree of nonlinear growth for the regexes found to have a nonlinear
upper bound for their worst-case matching time.
Degree
Repository 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Snort 246 72 500 5 3 2 1 0
RegExLib 156 38 16 3 4 1 0 1
simple analysis experimentally on a regex yields one of six possible results.
If the analysis completed successfully, the result will either be: Exponential
(indicated with Exp); Nonlinear (Nonlin) or Linear (Lin). These results indi-
cate the upper bound calculated for the worst-case matching time. If simple
analysis failed to analyse the regex successfully, the results can be: Skipped,
indicating a regex containing illegal syntax, requiring unhandled functional-
ity or requiring an excessive amount of memory to complete; or analysis time
exceeded some timeout value while calculating the degree of ambiguity (indi-
cated as “Timeout EDA”, or “Timeout IDA”, depending on which calculation
was running when the timeout occurred). Note that the simple analysis does
not yield the result “Nonlinear” if the result “Exponential” would also be appro-
priate. A timeout of 10 minutes was used for each regex analysed with simple
analysis. Running the simple analysis on the Snort and RegExLib repositories,
yielded the results tabulated in Table 10.2. For the regexes found to have a
nonlinear upper bound, the rate of growth was also calculated and is shown in
Table 10.3.
From the results in Table 10.2 we can see that there are multiple regexes
with an upper bound of exponential or nonlinear matching time. For many
regexes, however, the simple analysis timed out. This happened in spite of
the simple analysis having a polynomial worst-case execution time. In most of
these cases, the long execution time of the analysis was caused by large, finite
lower and upper bounds used in interval quantifiers. Our implementation of
the analyses converts such interval quantifiers into pNFAs by repeating the
operand subexpression to satisfy the lower and upper bounds. Consequently,
interval quantifiers with a large range between the lower and upper bound may
yield pNFAs of size potentially exponentially larger than the regex.
10.3 Full Analysis Results
If simple analysis indicates a nonlinear upper bound for worst-case matching
time, full analysis is performed to determine whether this upper bound is
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Table 10.4: The matching time behaviour, as determined by full analysis, of the
152 and 1048 regexes shown to have EDA and IDA, respectively, by simple analysis.
Simple Analysis Full Analysis
Exp Exp Nonlin Lin Skipped Timeout EDA Timeout IDA
152 137 0 2 1 12 0
Nonlin Exp Nonlin Lin Skipped Timeout EDA Timeout IDA
1048 0 394 24 3 0 627
Table 10.5: The degree of nonlinear growth for the regexes found to have nonlinear
worst-case matching time.
Degree
Repository 2 3 4 5
Snort 202 13 1 0
RegExLib 118 25 6 1
tight. Strictly speaking, it is only necessary to perform full analysis if the
exploit string, generated using the results of simple analysis, fails to trigger
exponential (or nonlinear) matching time.
Simple analysis determined that, in total, 152 regexes have an upper bound
of exponential worst-case matching time, 1048 have a nonlinear upper bound,
and 9991 have neither. The remaining 4302 regexes were either skipped, or
timed out. Full analysis was performed on the regexes with either an exponen-
tial or nonlinear upper bound for their worst-case matching time (as decided
experimentally by simple analysis). The results of the full analysis are given
in Table 10.4, which shows whether the worst-case matching time of a regex is
exponential, nonlinear or linear; or whether the analysis required an exceeding
amount of memory, or timed out. Again, the degree of nonlinear growth for all
regexes determined to have nonlinear matching time, is shown in Table 10.5.
All regexes classified as having exponential worst-case matching time were
tested against the Java regex matcher with their respective exploit strings.
These exploit strings are constructed as explained in Chapter 9. The test
involves repeatedly matching the vulnerable regex with the exploit string, in-
creasing the length of the pump and measuring the matching time. If the
matching time grows exponentially for a linear increase in the length of the
pump, the regex has been proven to be vulnerable. All of the regexes clas-
sified to have exponential worst-case matching time did indeed exhibit this
exponential growth in matching time and are therefore vulnerable.
10.4 Noteworthy Examples
To illustrate a case in which the simple analysis provides an inaccurate up-
per bound for the worst-case matching time of a regex, consider the regex
(\&d[0-9]{2}=.*?)+ from the Snort repository. This regex matches any input
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string with a prefix &d, followed by two digits and, followed by =. In order
to build an exploit string, we can use ε as prefix and &d00=&d00= as a pump.
Since .*? matches all strings, two copies of the string &d00= can be matched in
two ways: either once with the \&d[0-9]{2}= subexpression and once with the
.*? subexpression, or twice with the + operator. In spite of this, every time
the matcher cannot match part of the input string with the (\&d[0-9]{2}=)
subexpression, it will backtrack and match one character with .*? , and thus
all strings will be matched in linear time. In the simple analysis, it was de-
tected that the regex has an upper bound of exponential worst-case matching
time, due to exponential degree of ambiguity. However, when the full analysis
is performed, it was detected that the states causing the EDA are unreachable
when taking priorities into account. Therefore, full analysis classified the regex
as not being vulnerable.
Regexes with large constant matching time, might also be regarded as
being vulnerable (at least from a practical point of view). Next, we describe
an approach that worked well in practice to identify some of these regexes. If a
regex has a large interval quantifier, such as R := (S | T ){0, n}, for large n, the
regex can be approximated (in terms of language accepted and matching time)
with a Kleene star, as in (S |T )∗. The Snort repository contains an expression
of this form, namely \x20\x00([^\x00].|.[^\x00]){255} . Although the interval
quantifier is of the form {n}, and not {0, n}, we can still approximate the regex
with \x20\x00([^\x00].|.[^\x00])+ for the purpose of approximating worst-
case matching time. By using this approximation approach, our analysis was
able to point out that this regex is indeed vulnerable with the exploit string
\x20\x00 as prefix, aa as a pump and \x00\x00 as suffix. Matching this regex
with an appropriate exploit string corroborates the classification of this regex
as being vulnerable.
10.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we experimentally measured the viability of using static anal-
ysis to determine whether a regex is vulnerable. This was achieved by using
an implementation of the theory developed in the previous chapters to anal-
yse repositories of regexes used in practice. It was found that some regexes
used in practice are indeed vulnerable. The vulnerability of these regexes
was proven constructing an exploit string and experimentally measuring the
matching time.
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Chapter 11
Possible Solutions
11.1 Introduction
In this chapter we discuss how to turn vulnerable regexes into harmless equiva-
lent regexes, in spite of the inherent vulnerability of backtracking matchers. As
we have related regex ambiguity and regex vulnerability in Chapters 6 and 7,
our techniques for fixing vulnerable regexes focus on reducing the degree of
ambiguity of a regex and its subexpressions.
As we have seen in Chapter 7, not all unambiguous regexes are harmless.
Specifically, recall the example given with the regex E1E2, where the subex-
pression E1 has exponential degree of ambiguity and L(E2) = ∅. Therefore,
when trying to fix a vulnerable regex, we rather need to reduce the degree of
ambiguity of each of its subexpressions with infinite or exponential degree of
ambiguity individually, rather the regex as a whole. A backtracking matcher
is able to accept or reject any input string with minimal backtracking when
matching with a regex containing no ambiguous subexpressions, and conse-
quently, such regexes cannot be vulnerable.
The available techniques for the remediation of vulnerable regexes depend
on the purpose of the regex in the incorporating software. If a vulnerable
regex EV is used solely for the purpose of membership testing to L(EV), we
may consider any harmless regex EH such that L(EH) = L(EV), as a viable
replacement option. On the other hand, if a regex is also used for parsing a
successfully matched input string (such as explained in Chapter 3), our options
for selecting an equivalent harmless regex are more restricted.
11.2 Equivalent Regex Replacement
When a vulnerable regex is used only to determine whether certain input
strings are matched by it or not, such as a regex used for user input validation,
then the only requirement on a replacement harmless regex is that it must
accept the same input strings as the original vulnerable regex. We are therefore
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looking for a harmless regex EH such that L(EH) = L(EV), where EV denotes
the original vulnerable regex.
We start the process of obtaining EH by finding unambiguous automata,
and specifically DFA, that matches L(EV(i)), where the EV(i) are subexpres-
sions of EV with infinite or exponential degree of ambiguity.
It is well known that every NFA A can be converted to a (state) min-
imised DFA, denoted by dfa(A), recognising the same language, but with po-
tentially exponentially many more states. One way of achieving this is to
use the methods described in [38] and [39]. Thus for a vulnerable regex EV
with subexpressions EV(i) having infinite or exponential degree of ambiguity,
we can construct EH by replacing dfa(nfa(Jp(EV(i)))) by language equivalent
unambiguous expressions EU(i).
In [29] a method, referred to as the flow-graph technique, is given for con-
verting an NFA A into a language equivalent regex E. However, it is not
guaranteed that after applying this method to a DFA, that a strongly unam-
biguous regex is obtained. We therefore give the adapted flow-graph technique
from [40], for which this guarantee can indeed be made.
When applying the adapted flow-graph technique to a DFA M = (Q =
{q1, . . . , qn},Σ, q1, δ, F ), let R(i, j, k) be a regex for the language of strings
obtained when starting and ending at states qi and qj respectively, and using
only states q1, . . . , qk as intermediate states. We define R(i, j, 0) as:
R(i, j, 0) =

(α | β | . . .) if we have transitions on α, β, . . .
from qi to qj;
∅ i 6= j, and we have no transitions
from qi to qj;
ε i = j, and we have no transitions
from qi to qj.
For i 6= k, j 6= k, k > 0 let
R(i, j, k) = R1 |R2R3∗R4,
where
R1 = R(i, j, k − 1);
R2 = R(i, k, k − 1);
R3 = R(k, k, k − 1);
R4 = R(k, j, k − 1).
In order to obtain a strongly unambiguous regex (with no subexpression E
such that L(E) = ∅), we simplify R(i, j, k), for i 6= k, j 6= k, k > 0, as follows.
If R2 = ∅ or R4 = ∅ we let
R(i, j, k) = R1,
and if R3 = ε, we instead let
R(i, j, k) = R1 |R2R4.
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For i = k, j 6= k let
R(i, j, k) = R1
∗R2,
where
R1 = R(k, k, k − 1);
R2 = R(k, j, k − 1),
with the simplification that if R1 = ε, then
R(i, j, k) = R2.
Similarly, when i 6= k, j = k
R(i, j, k) = R1R2
∗,
where
R1 = R(i, k, k − 1);
R2 = R(k, k, k − 1),
except for R2 = ε, when we simplify as follows:
R(i, j, k) = R1.
Finally, when i = j = k
R(i, j, k) = R1
∗,
where
R1 = R(i, j, k − 1),
except for R1 = ε, when we simplify as follows:
R(i, j, k) = ε.
The regex equivalent to the original DFA is now obtained as
R(1, j1, n) | . . . |R(1, jm, n) ,
where {qj1 , . . . , qjm} = F .
This adapted flow-graph technique produces a strongly unambiguous regex,
since it ensures a one-to-one correspondence between paths in the original DFA
and paths in the constructed regex.
We illustrate the usage of the adapted flow-graph technique by finding a
harmless regex equivalent to the vulnerable regex EV = (\w+(/\w+.∗?)∗[.]txt),
used for matching paths in a directory structure to text files. The regex EV
contains a subexpression EV(5) = (/\w+.∗?)∗ with exponential degree of am-
biguity. To see that this subexpression has exponential ambiguity, note that
the annotated regex YsA(EV(5)) equals 1(23/45(6\w)+7(8.)∗?)∗, and observe
that YsA(EV(5)) matches, among others, strings of the form 1s0s1 . . . sn, where
si ∈ {23/456a723/456a7, 23/456a78/8a}. Since piΣ(1s0s1 . . . sn) = (/a/a)n in
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q1 q2 q3
q4
/
[^/]
\w
[^\w]
.
.
Figure 11.1: The minimised DFA dfa(nfa(Jp((/\w+.∗?)∗))).
Table 11.1: The values of R(i, j, k) when applying the flow-graph technique to
dfa(nfa(Jp((/\w+.∗?)∗))).
R(i, j, 0)
i
j
0 1 2 3
0 ε / ∅ [^/]
1 ∅ ε \w [^\w]
2 ∅ ∅ . ∅
3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .
R(i, j, 1)
i
j
0 1 2 3
0 ε / /\w [^/] | /[^\w]
1 ∅ ε \w [^\w]
2 ∅ ∅ . ∅
3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .
R(i, j, 2)
i
j
0 1 2 3
0 ε / /\w.∗ [^/] | /[^\w]
1 ∅ ε \w.∗ [^\w]
2 ∅ ∅ .∗ ∅
3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .
R(i, j, 3)
i
j
0 1 2 3
0 ε / /\w.∗ [^/] | /[^\w].∗
1 ∅ ε \w.∗ [^\w].∗
2 ∅ ∅ .∗ ∅
3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .
each case, there are 2n words vi ∈ L(YsA(EV(5))) such that piΣ(vi) = w for
w = (/a/a)n, and thus EV(5) has exponential degree of ambiguity.
Having determined the subexpression causing the vulnerability in EV, we
need to find a suitable alternative. We construct A = dfa(nfa(Jp(EV(5)))), as
shown in Figure 11.1. Intuitively, we can confirm the correctness of A by not-
ing that EV(5) will match either the empty string, or any input string with the
prefix /w, where w is a word character. Next, we apply the flow-graph tech-
nique to A. The different values of R(i, j, k), required for this process is shown
in Table 11.1. Using the values from the table, we obtain the strongly un-
ambiguous regex EU(5) matching L(EV(5)), given by (R(0, 0, 3) |R(0, 2, 3)) =
(ε | /\w.∗). Finally, we obtain EH by substituting EV(5) by EU(5), which yields
EH = (\w(ε | /\w.∗)[.]txt).
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In general, one cannot simply replace a vulnerable regex by any harmless
language equivalent regex, as this might change the behaviour of the capturing
groups (or even remove them). We illustrate this with the previous example
where EV = (\w+(/\w+.∗?)∗[.]txt). In EV, the capturing group (/\w+.∗?)
can be used to capture the filename in the path to the text file matched by
the regex, but in EH = (\w(ε | /\w.∗)[.]txt), however, the capturing group
(ε | /\w.∗) will also match the names of directories in the path as well.
11.3 Using Atomic Groups and Possessive
Quantifiers
As explained in Section 3.4.5, atomic groups and possessive quantifiers in-
struct a regex matcher to disregard certain matching options. The concept of
possessive quantifiers is described in [41] as follows:
“A feature I think would be useful, but that no regex flavor that I know of
has, is what I would call possessive quantifiers. They would act like normal
quantifiers except that once they made a decision that met with local success,
they would never backtrack to try the other option. The text they match could
be unmatched if their enclosing subexpression was unmatched, but they would
never give up matched text of their own volition, even in deference to an overall
match.”
Subsequent to this quote, both possessive quantifiers and a generalisation
thereof, atomic groups, were added to some regular expression matcher imple-
mentations, such as in Java. As possessive quantifiers can be represented with
atomic groups, our discussion will focus only on the latter.
Atomic groups can be used to remove vulnerabilities in some regexes, by
instructing the matcher to disregard the backtracking possibilities discovered
within the atomic group. For example, the regex (E1 |E2)∗, for unambiguous
expressions E1 and E2 where w ∈ L(E1) ∩ L(E2), where w 6= ε, has expo-
nential degree of ambiguity. In this example, strings of the form wnr, where
r 6∈ (E1 |E2)∗, can be used as exploit strings. Using the atomic operator (or
making the Kleene star possessive) to change (E1 |E2)∗ into (?>(E1 |E2)∗) or
(?>(E1 |E2))∗, will remove the vulnerability, due to the fact that backtracking
possibilities are forgotten by the matcher after matching a substring (of an
exploit string) with an atomic group.
Unfortunately, the above mentioned strategy cannot be used to remove
vulnerabilities from all regexes. In some cases, introducing an atomic group
in a regex changes the language accepted by the regex. Consider for example
the vulnerable regex ((a | b)∗)∗b, which can be exploited by using strings of
the form anc. Modifying the regex to (?>((a | b)∗)∗)b or (?>(a | b)∗)∗b, will
have the effect that the strings akb are no longer matched, while the regexes
(?>((a | b)∗)∗b) and ((?>a | b)∗)∗b are still vulnerable to the exploit strings anc.
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A more in-depth discussion on how to model regexes with atomic groups can
be found in [42].
11.3.1 Examples
Before we consider an example of how atomic groups can be used to remove
a vulnerability from a regex, let us first consider a regex for which this is not
possible. Consider the regex R1 used to validate the path to an HTML file,
extracted from the RegExLib repository [37], given by:
^(([a-zA-Z]:)|(\\{2}\w+)\$?)(\\(\w[\w ]*.*))+\.((html|HTML)|(htm|HTM))$
R1 is vulnerable due to the exponential ambiguity in the subexpression S1 =
(\\(\w[\w ]*.*))+ . Note that the string \a\a can be matched either using the
subexpressions E1 = \\ , E2 = \w[\w ]* and E3 = .* , or using only E1 and
E2 and using twice the outer + operator. Changing the subgroup S1 to be
atomic, i.e., changing S1 to A1 = (?>(\\(\w[\w ]*.*))+) , would indeed remove
the vulnerability, but since the atomic subgroup contains a greedy Kleene
star subexpression, A1 will match the rest of the input string, hogging the
symbols from the suffix subexpression \.((html|HTML)|(htm|HTM))$ . Therefore,
this regex cannot be fixed, at least not in the obvious ways, by using atomic
groups. Fortunately, the vulnerability can be removed without using atomic
operators. Inspecting subgroup S1, it can be seen that it accepts any string
with the prefix \a. Consequently, we can substitute S1 with the subgroup
(\\(\w.*)) . Applying this fix does not change the behaviour of the capturing
groups. Note that for any matching input string the + operator in the sub-
group S1 is superfluous. The .* subexpression will consume the rest of the
input string and symbols will be released until they are rematched with the
\.((html|HTML)|(htm|HTM))$ subexpression. Furthermore, [\w ]*.* is equiva-
lent to .* . Therefore, the subexpression (\w.*) will match in the same way as
the subexpression (\w[\w ]*.*) , and so the capturing of these two groups will
be equivalent. The same goes for the capturing groups in the subexpressions
(\\(\w[\w ]*.*)) and (\\(\w.*)) .
Next we consider a regex, referred to as R2, which is a slightly simplified
version of a regex extracted from the RegExLib [37] repository,
^([0-9a-z]([-.\w]*[0-9a-z])*@(([0-9a-z])+([-\w]*[0-9a-z])*\.)+[a-z]{2,9})$
used for email address validation. This regex is vulnerable due to the sub-
groups S1,1 = ([-.\w]*[0-9a-z])* and S1,2 = ([-\w]*[0-9a-z])* . Both S1,1
and S1,2 have exponential degree of ambiguity and can match the input string
(aa)n in exponentially many ways, in n. Note that S1,1 is followed by the
subexpression @ , which does not match any common strings also matched
by S1,1. Consequently, modifying S1,1 to be atomic, cannot hog any symbols
from the suffix expressions. Therefore, S1,1 can be made atomic and it will
no longer contribute to the vulnerability of the regex. A similar argument
holds for why S1,2 can be made atomic. Therefore, the vulnerability of this
email address validation regex can be fixed by changing the subgroups S1,1 and
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S1,2 to be atomic, that is (?>([-.\w]*[0-9a-z])*) and (?>([-\w]*[0-9a-z])*) ,
respectively.
11.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the problem of mitigating the vulnera-
bility of evil regexes. Two methods for achieving this have been provided and
the context in which each method would be preferable has been investigated.
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Future Work and Conclusions
12.1 Future Work
12.1.1 Extending the Regex Mathematical Model
An obvious route for future work is to extend the analyses Defined in Chapter 8
to accommodate more of the features found in modern regex matchers. Some
of the features not supported in our current model includes atomic groups,
lookaround assertions, and backreferences. For a description of each of these
features, refer to Chapter 3. In this section we briefly discuss mathematical
models that might have the potential to model these features.
12.1.2 Modeling with Two-way Pushdown Automata
To model the behaviour of atomic groups in a regex, one might consider using
a two-way pushdown automaton (2DPDA) [43]. A 2DPDA is a finite-state
automaton with a stack that allows for the storage of stack symbols. The
2DPDA deterministically selects the next state to transition to, depending on
the symbol at the current position in the input string and the current symbol
at the top of the stack. With each transition of a 2DPDA, in addition to the
next state being chosen, a symbol may be pushed onto or popped from the
stack, and the position in the input string may be moved to the left or right.
Using a 2DPDA to model the matching behaviour of a backtracking regex
matcher will allow backtracking possibilities to be stored as states on the stack.
This type of 2DPDA will have two modes, namely a matching and a backtrack-
ing mode (these modes can be encoded into the states of the automaton).
In matching mode, when a 2DPDA reads a symbol from the input string,
similar to an NFA, the position in the input string is moved to the right and
the automaton transitions to a new state. The 2DPDA pushes a symbol onto
the stack for every input symbol read, say X. Priorities are modeled by the
2DPDA, by always traversing to the state corresponding to the highest priority
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choice (making it deterministic) and pushing the lower priority options, in
order, onto the stack. These states can be transitioned to when backtracking.
In backtracking mode, the 2DPDA pops X symbols from the stack while
moving left in the input string, until a state is found at the top of the stack.
This state is then popped from the stack and transitioned to.
A 2DPDA has the added benefit of being able to model atomic groups
more intuitively. Special symbols are pushed onto the stack when entering
and exiting the atomic group, say Ai and Zi, where i is be used to distinguish
between specific atomic groups. When the 2DPDA is in backtracking mode
and a Zi symbol is found at the top of the stack (indicating the exit of an
atomic group), the 2DPDA pops symbols from the stack (including stored,
lower priority states) until the corresponding Ai symbol is found. After this, it
resumes the regular backtracking behaviour and transitions to the next state
found on the stack. This will effectively eliminate all backtracking possibilities
originating from within the atomic group.
As 2DPDAs accept languages that are not regular [43], one cannot simply
convert such an automaton to a pNFA and use the analyses developed in Chap-
ter 8 to detect vulnerable regexes. Using these automata to detect vulnerable
regexes would require an analysis procedure to be developed specifically for
2DPDAs.
12.1.3 Modeling with Alternating Finite-state
Automata
A model that might be promising for modeling regexes with lookaround asser-
tions, specifically positive lookahead assertions, is called an alternating finite-
state automaton (AFA) [44]. AFAs are a generalisation of NFAs. Where an
NFA will accept an input string if any nondeterministic path ends in an accept
state, an AFA can require that multiple paths end in an accept state. This
is achieved by defining both universal states (∀-states) and existential states
(∃-states). To explain the intuition of matching with an AFA, we will explain
how it differs to matching with an NFA. For an NFA, when a nondeterministic
choice is encountered when reading the input string, it can be thought of as
if the NFA branches into multiple NFAs being run in parallel. Each paral-
lel NFA transitions to a different state presented within the nondeterministic
choice. The NFA accepts the input string if any of these parallel NFAs accept
the input string. The ∃-states of an AFA exhibit the same behaviour. Indeed,
an AFA containing only ∃-states, is equivalent to an NFA. Conversely, for the
∀-states, the AFA branches into multiple AFAs run in parallel and the input
string is only accepted if every parallel AFA, generated at this state, accepts
the input string.
The ∀-states in an AFA are useful for modeling positive lookahead asser-
tions in regexes. A positive lookahead assertion requires that the expression
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contained therein matches a prefix of the remainder of the input string. There-
fore, a successful match is only possible if this requirement is fulfilled, as well
as a successful match with all subsequent subexpressions. A ∀-state can be
used to enforce both these requirements in a regex.
As the sets of languages accepted by AFAs are exactly the set of regular
languages, it is possible to construct an NFA matching the same language as
an AFA [44]. Ideally, an NFA converted from an AFA should then be used
to analyse regexes with positive lookahead assertions. It was found, however,
that the conversion from AFA to NFA causes inaccuracies in the analysis.
As explained in Chapter 3, the Java regex matcher handles positive lookahead
assertions by first matching with the expression contained within the assertion.
If this match is successful, it resets its position in the input string to where it
was before matching with the assertion expression. It then proceeds to match
with the subexpressions subsequent to the positive lookahead assertion. This
causes the disparities between the matching time observed in the Java regex
matcher and the results of analysing an NFA converted from an AFA. Consider
for example a regex (?=E1)E2, where E1.∗ is vulnerable when using exploit
strings of the form wnr, and assume L(E1) ∩ L(E2) = ∅. Using (?=E1)E2 to
match wnr, will still exhibit exponential matching time in n, as the matcher
first attempts to match the exploit string with the vulnerable subexpression.
However, removing the positive lookahead assertion by converting an AFA
constructed for (?=E1)E2 to an NFA, will also remove the vulnerability. It is
simple to confirm this, as this NFA will match ∅.
12.1.4 Modeling with Memory Automata
Finally, when attempting to analyse regexes with backreferences, one could
look at memory automata (MFA) [3; 45]. An MFA allows for the storage
of substrings of the input string matched by the matcher, in memory cells.
These substrings can then be recalled and compared to the remainder of the
input string. This can be used to model backreferences, by creating a memory
cell for every capturing that is backreferenced to in the regex. When matching
with the subexpression within the capturing group, the substring can be stored
within the memory cell. When the backreference subexpression is encountered,
this memory cell is then consulted for the substring that was matched. As
MFA are capable of matching languages that are not regular, one would have
to develop new analysis techniques to decide whether the regex modeled with
an MFA is vulnerable.
12.2 Conclusions
ReDoS presents a formidable security threat to web applications that rely on
regexes, as illustrated by examples given of ReDoS that occurred in practice.
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However, in spite of these occurrences, the phenomenon remains largely unex-
plored from a theoretical perspective.
By using formal language theory as a basis and performing an inspection
of the source code of backtracking regex matchers it was possible to derive
a concise mathematical model of regex backtracking matching behaviour in a
modern regex matcher. The model is defined in terms of pNFAs (prioritised
nondeterministic finite-state automata) and is capable of modeling both the
traditional features of regexes, as well as some of the extensions implemented
in modern regex matchers.
We used pNFAs in conjunction with the notion of ambiguity of nonde-
terministic finite-state automata, as well as the concepts of weak and strong
ambiguity of regexes, to define a vulnerable regex formally. The accuracy of
this definition was investigated as well as which exceptions could exist there-
for. We then derived a procedure to detect vulnerabilities in regexes. Our
techniques were validated by testing it on two repositories of regexes used in
practice. It was found that some regexes used in practice are indeed vulnerable.
If a regex is classified as vulnerable there must exist some input string
that can trigger inordinately long matching time. We explained a procedure
to construct such input strings. Using this procedure, we confirmed the vul-
nerability of all regexes classified as having worst-case exponential matching
time by our techniques by experimentally measuring the matching time when
using the Java regex matcher. We have suggested approaches which can be
used to mitigate the vulnerabilities after they have been found, where the best
approach depends on the context in which the regex is used in the software.
Lastly, we have investigated multiple, potential avenues for extending our anal-
ysis of regexes by providing automata theoretical models which could be used
to model some of the regex extensions implemented in modern matchers.
In conclusion, the research presented within this thesis provides a basis for
software developers and academics to understand the concept of evil regexes.
In turn, this will help raise awareness of the problem and provide the computer
science community with the means to defend against ReDoS attacks.
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Appendix A
Nonprecise Modeling of Repeated
Epsilon Transitions
Before we can explain the cases in which ε-transitions may be repeated, we
need to understand in greater detail how capturing groups operate. Let us
emphasise capturing groups in regexes by adding integer subscripts to the
opening and closing parenthesis of a capturing group. For example, in the
regex E(1F )1R, the capturing group, group 1, is denoted by the subscripts
1 after the parentheses. After an input string is successfully matched with
a regex, each capturing group contains the substring that was matched by
the corresponding subexpression. Continuing with the regex of our previous
example, E(1F )1R, suppose w ∈ L(E(1F )1R). After matching this regex with
w, the capturing group, group 1, will contain the substring w1 ∈ L(F ) of w,
matched with the subexpression F .
When a capturing group is used multiple times in a successful matching pro-
cess, it contains only the last substring matched by the expression within the
capturing group. For example, consider the regex ((1[ab])1c)∗. After matching
the input string acacbc, group 1 will contain the substring b, although it also
matched an a during the matching process. If a capturing group is bypassed
entirely during the matching process, such as when matching the input string
b with the regex (1a)1 | b, we say the capturing group is NULL. Note that this
should not be confused with the case in which the capturing group is traversed,
but matches the empty string.
Finally, consider the pNFA shown in Figure A.1, which represents the regex
(1a
∗)1∗. The transition q0 → q1 opens up the capturing group and q1 → q0
closes it. Any symbols read between the last traversal of these two transitions
will be contained in the capturing group after the match has completed (if no
symbols are read, the capturing group will contain ε). When matching the
input string aaa with this regex using Java, the capturing group contains the
substring ε. Thus after aaa was matched, the matcher proceeds to match the
empty string with (1a∗)1. Looking at the pNFA in Figure A.1, this suggests
that after leaving the inner (1a∗)1 via the q1 → q0 transition, the matcher again
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q0
q1q2
q3
ε1
ε2
ε2
ε1
a
Figure A.1: (a) A pNFA simulating the matching behaviour of the regex (a∗)∗ in
Java.
takes the q0 → q1 → q0 ε-loop to accept the empty string. This implies that
the q1 → q0 transition was traversed twice without consuming an intermediate
input symbol.
To model the behaviour of the Java backtracking matcher more accurately,
one would have to develop a model which allows for the reuse of certain ε-
transitions, without consuming an input symbol between these uses. In spite
of this, as the model used currently is sufficient for the detection of vulnerable
regexes (as shown in Chapter 10), it was decided to use the simpler, albeit less
accurate model.
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Appendix B
Sensitive Data Exposure and Evil
Regexes
In some contrived situations, evil regexes can be exploited to expose sensitive
data. The circumstances that may lead to this vulnerability are listed below.
1. A user must be able to specify a regex to be used by the system.
2. This regex must be matched against sensitive data.
3. The regex matcher used must be vulnerable to evil regexes.
Note that since the user-controlled regex is matching sensitive data, we
may assume that the user is not shown the result of this matching, otherwise
exposing the sensitive data would be trivial.
As an example, suppose that a user-controlled regex is matching a 32 char-
acter hexadecimal password hash. The core of the exploit rests on the fact
that the regex .{32} will successfully match the password hash in much less
time than a regex such as (.*){N}G would, for some large value N , due to
IDA. Ideally, N should be chosen large enough to create a noticeable delay in
the response time of the system, but not so large as to cause it to enter a state
of denial of service. The G in the regex is simply used to force a match with
the hexadecimal characters of the password hash to fail. In the general case,
the expression [A&&B] can be used to force a match to fail (this expression is
the character class formed from the result of the intersection of the character
classes [A] and [B] , which is empty).
Giving the regex (([0-7].{31})|((.*){100}G)) to the system, will allow us
to infer information about the first hexadecimal character of the password
hash. Inspecting this regex reveals that the matching time will be fast for
all password hashes starting with a character in the character class [0-7] .
For these password hashes, the match will complete in linear time with the
([0-7].{31}) branch of the alternation. All other password hashes will reject
the [0-7] character class and rather match with the ((.*){100}G)) branch,
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for which the matching time will be polynomial of high degree (supposing,
however, that the matching time is still short enough to wait for the system to
complete in a reasonable amount of time). Therefore, timing the response time
of the system will allow us to infer whether the first hexadecimal character of
the password hash is the character class [0-7] , or otherwise in [89A-F] .
After the first inference, we can tighten the bounds of the character class we
now know the first character to be in. Suppose, without loss of generality, that
the character is in the character class [0-7] . We now give the system the regex
(([0-3].{31})|((.*){100}G)) . Timing the response time will tell us whether the
character is within the character class [0-3] , or otherwise in [4-7] . By contin-
uing in this fashion of measuring the response time and tightening the bounds
of the character classes, we can calculate the first character of the password
hash exactly. After the first character has been calculated, we can infer the
other characters by using the regexes ((.{1}[0-7].{30})|((.*){100}G)) , . . . ,
and ((.{31}[0-7])|((.*){100}G)) in a similar manner.
This regex based binary search allows us to infer the password hash exactly
with 128 or less regexes.
Even though the example given is contrived and may possibly never occur
in practice, it is nevertheless important to know that evil regexes might be
used for an attack on an aspect of information security other than availability.
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